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ABSTRACT
MARX'S CONCEPT OF LABOR
SEPTEMBER, 1990

CHRISTOPHER

J.

MULVANEY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Jean

B.

Elshtain

This work examines Habermas' claim that Marx's theory
is

latently obj ectivistic due to a restrictive, instrumental

understanding of the concept of labor.

In this

interpretation, Marx's work is a form of positivism and

scientistic in epistemological orientation.

a

related claim

is that as a result of the above Marx's theory lacks a

normative foundation adequate to support its claim of
critique.

An even further expansion of the claim, which

makes clear its political dimension, is that this series of

misconceptions on Marx's part lie at the root of the
subsequent development of

a

technocratic variety of social

theory embodied in the bureaucratic centralist Countries of

Eastern Europe.

Ultimately, Habermas' work entails

a

fundamental

misunderstanding of Marx's critique of capitalism and the

v

structure of Marx's thought.

it is this failure to

understand adequately the structure of Marx's
theory that
makes possible Habermas reading of Marx.
This work argues
that Marx's theory is doubly bisected, first
by the
•

distinction between appearance and reality, and
second, by
distinction between the metatheoretical and historical

a

levels of analysis.

In conclusion,

it is argued that although Habermas'

interpretation of Marx is inadequate, both Marx and Habermas
share a project that invites subjects to conceive of social

relations free of the distortions of power, deception and

self-deception on Habermas' part, and exploitation and
alienation on Marx's part.
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CHAPTER

I

HABERMAS' ANALYSIS OF MARX

Introduction

Negative Dialectics Theodor Adorno remarks that

material reality can not be subsumed by categories of

thought without leaving

a

"remainder."

He states further

that "The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with,

than that objects do not go into their concepts without

leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the

traditional norms of adequacy ... It indicates the untruth
of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust

the thing conceived."^

In a similar fashion, Marx's work

has never fit well into the categorical containers

constructed to house it by political theorists, social
philosophers, and intellectual historians.

This work scrutinizes a claim, one that in different
forms has reappeared consistently in the secondary

literature on Marx.

^

(1973)

,

p.

5.

Most recently this claim has been

2

articulated with considerable force and
clarity by Jurgen
Habermas as a part of his project to clarify
the

epistemological status of critical theory.

The claim has been variously stated but is

essentially this: Marx's theory is latently obj
ectivistic
due to a restrictive, instrumental understanding
of the

concept of labor.

In this light, Marx's theory is a form

of positivism and scientistic in epistemological

orientation.

A further and related claim is that as a

result of the above Marx's theory lacks an adequate

normative foundation and thus can not sustain
of capitalism.

a

critique

An even further expansion of this claim,

and one which makes clear the political dimension of this
debate, is that this series of errors and misconceptions
on Marx's part lie at the root of the subsequent

development of a bureaucratic and technocratic variety of
social theory.

While there have been numerous scholarly works on

Habermas and the Frankfurt School,^ few have raised the
issue of whether or not this interpretation is correct.

Geuss correctly notes that this "...would require a

full-scale analysis of Marx's work..."

^

(1979)

However, he states

notably by McCarthy (1978), Kortian (1980),
and Geuss (1981).

Sensat

.

3

that "...it isn't clear how the answer
to this historical
question would bear on... the possibility
of a critical
theory.^ I will maintain that the
answer to this question
bears powerfully and centrally on the
philosophical

foundations of critical theory.

Marx was a philosopher who retrained himself
as an
economist. While Marx did not produce a work of

philosophy that systematically elaborated his theoretical
assumptions, he nonetheless held to certain assumptions

that informed and structured his work.

In fact, these

philosophical assumptions infuse his 'mature' work and

a

reading of books like Capital that fails to account for a

philosophic dimension are impoverished.

What we think

these assumptions are, and specifically the meaning we
give to Marx's concept of labor, has a direct and

significant impact on our understanding of the problem of
the epistemological and normative foundations of critical

theory that Habermas and others are investigating and wish
to clarify.

Critical theorists draw upon two major figures in the

Western intellectual tradition as prototypical of

a social

and political theory with an interest in emancipation:

^

(1981)

,

p.

3

.

4

Marx and Freud.

Despite innumerable treatments of both

theorists, there is little agreement to be
found in the
literature. Rather than agreement and consensus,
what one
finds in the secondary literature are deep
philosophical,

political and ideological cleavages.

Debates on Marx,

perhaps more than any other theorist, reflect these

cleavages

Precisely because of the fundamental issues raised in

Marx's challenge to traditional theory much of the debate
on Marx is carried out in highly reified terms.

For

example, debate is often cast in terms of schools of

thought interpreting another school of thought's
interpretation.

Indeed, Geuss poses the question in

precisely these terms: that is, is the 'Frankfurt reading'
of Marx correct or not?

Raising the question in this manner presupposes some

untenable abstractions.

Ignoring for the moment who is

and is not a member of the Frankfurt School (or whose

theory is an instance of Frankfurt theory) we must assume
there is a theory separate and abstracted from the

particular individuals who comprised the Frankfurt School.
We must then look for that part of 'Frankfurt theory'

which constitutes an interpretation of Marx.

5

This may be convenient in as much as
it frees one
from considering the history of particular
theorists

at

particular stages of their intellectual
development.
the convenience, however, lies the risk.

m

The risk is the

loss of the historical dimension.

The loss of the rich

context and historical diversity of individual
intellectual development, the historical context of
issues, debates and understandings, how they arise
and how

theorists responded, leaves our understanding
impoverished.

For these reasons

I

will not focus on such issues as

the relationship of Habermas to the Frankfurt School, Marx
and Marxism, the Frankfurt School and Marx, or Habermas
and Marxism.

Nor will the subsequent analysis be cast in

terms of "being informed by" or "derived from" any

theorist or school of thought.

The focus of this work is Habermas and Marx.

The

analysis presented below will deal with Marxism briefly
and only to note the extent that Habermas' analysis is

weakened by

a failure to

Marx and his epigones.

adequately distinguish between

,

6
I

begin with

a

summary of Habermas- analysis of Marx.

The claims Habermas makes with respect
to Marx's concept
of labor, scientistic and positivistic
tendencies
in Marx,

and emancipatory interest will be
spelled out and

some preliminary objections raised.

I

then turn to

a

reconstruction of Marx's concept of

labor in its anthropological, ontological,
epistemolgical
and economic dimensions.

l

advance the thesis that Marx's

theory is coherent and that each of the above dimensions
is structured by an appearance/reality distinction
and a

distinction between metatheoretical and historical levels
of analysis.

The term 'reconstruction' means the reproduction of
an author's meaning and argument by the discovery and

elaboration of the 'rules' the author follows in

constructing his or her theory.
constrain

a

The rules of a game

participant to known or knowable patterns of

thought and/or action.

An observer, who may not know or

only partially know the rules, must attempt to construct
the rules from the players actions.

In this vein,

I

attempt to read-off the rules that structure Marx's work
and to re-present Marx's work.
terms,

"explicate the meaning of

will,

I

a

in Habermas'

symbolic formation in

.
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terms of the rules according to which
the author must have
brought it forth...

On the basis of the analysis in
Chapter Two,
in the concluding Chapter that
Habermas

I

argue

analysis of

'

Marx's concept of labor is, at best, partial,
and at worst
results from a fundamental misunderstanding
of the

structure of Marx's thought.

In effect,

prey to the problem that animates Adorno
theory: non-identity.

Habermas falls
'

s

epistemological

in other words, Marx's theory can

not be subsumed by Habermas' framework of knowledge

constitutive interests.

I

will then examine the

implications of this for Habermas' project of

reconstituting the normative foundations of critical
social theory.

The Terms of the Debate

There is no concept more centrally important to the

interpretation of Marx's social and political philosophy
than labor.

The meaning of the term has important

consequences for an interpretation of all aspects of
Marx's theory.

(1979)

,

The ontological, epistemological,

p.

12

.

anthropological, ethical, political and
economic
assumptions of Marx are all closely bound
up with the
meaning of the concept.

The problem of interpreting Marx's
theoretical

assumptions has occupied the attention of
scholars and
polemicists, a distinction frequently hard to
make,

the better part of the last century.

there is little consensus.

for

Not surprisingly,

On a general level of

interpretation, one cannot help but be intrigued by the

starkly contradictory claims made about Marx.

To his

adherents he is the greatest of the classical political

economists but to his opponents he is a minor

post-Ricardian^

He is either a "great systematic

philosopher in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant and
Hegel"^ or a largely confused, unclear contradictory
thinker.''

His literary abilities are equally suspect;

either the man's style is opaque and utterly lacking in

clarity or it is rich, lucid, powerful and evocative.^

^

Sameulson (1957),

^

Gould (1978)

,

p.

Plamenatz (1975),
g

p.

911.

xi.
p. 449-450.

for
an
analysis of the
interrelationship of
philosophical, literary and economic themes in Capital see
R.P. Wolff (1980).
For a summary of the widely held view
that Marx's work lacks rigor and coherence see McMurty
(1978)

9

The situation improves little, if
at all, when one
examines more specific areas of debate
over Marx's
assumptions. with respect to ontology,
Marx is

undoubtedly a materialist but what kind of
materialist is
in doubt.
Is Marx's epistemology simply an
inversion of
Hegel replacing spirit with matter or is the
question more
complicated? Did Marx hold a copy or reflection
theory of

knowledge or does the theory of false-consciousness
and
fetishism imply a more sophisticated and highly mediated
theory of the relationship of being and consciousness?
Did Marx hold any theory of human nature and if so what

was it, i.e., was he a humanist or theoretical

anti-humanist?

In the realm of ethics, was Marx's

critique of capitalism based solely on moral outrage or
was it scientific and therefore more effective and valid

because it was not compromised by emotion, values and
other infections of irrationality?

What political

position did Marx hold: was he a radical democrat,
totalitarian or, perhaps, an anarchist?

Finally,

is the

labor theory of value metaphysical baggage that can be

discarded with no harm to Marx's theory of capitalism, or
is it the key to unlocking the mysteries of capitalist

development?'

see Steedman
Gintis (1981)
'

.

(1977)

,

Lippi

(1979)

and

Bowles and

10

Implicitly, the question of Marx's
theoretical
assumptions was raised when he declared
to La Fargue:
"One thing is certain— I myself am no
Marxist." with this
remark Marx distanced himself from the
positions of the
growing socialist labor movement in Germany.
From that
point on, the extent to which the socialist
movement could
be identified with Marxian theory, regardless
of the

self-understandings of Bernstein, Kautsky, Plekhonov
and
generations of others, is in doubt.

Explicitly, the question of Marx's presuppositions

became a heated and central issue following the collapse
of socialism at the outbreak of World War

I,

the failure

of socialist revolutions in Western Europe following the
war,

and the emerging criticism of Lenin's political

theory.

The major figures in this re-evaluation of the

presuppositions of Marxist orthodoxy are well known as are
the debates they initiated over the theory and
of Marxism:

practice

Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, Rosa Luxemburg and

Antonio Gramsci.

One central argument advanced by both

Lukacs and Korsch was that orthodox Marxists had

1)

fetishized facts and the laws of history, and

viewed

scientific socialism more and more as

a set of

2)

purely

11

scientific observations J°

As Habermas would almost fifty

years later, Lukacs and Korsch made
the dissolution of
Marxism into a kind of positivism concerned
with

facts,

laws, and empirical, objective analysis,
a primary target
of their critique.

By the turn of the century, Marx's theory
was clearly

suffering from the vicissitudes of institutionalization:
an orthodoxy had emerged along with the Social
Democratic

Parties

Criticism emerged from the group of dissidents

named above.

Interestingly, they tended to have strong

training in the German Idealist tradition and especially
in the works of Hegel.

They began a systematic re-

thinking of Marx's theoretical assumptions and critique of
orthodox Marxism.

Their writing, not only provoked a

serious re-evaluation of Marxism, but also the most

significant division in Marxian intellectual history, the
split between orthodox and Western, or Neo-Marist theory.
The questions they raised still provide the framework for

much of the theoretical debate among critical theorists.

^°

Korsch (1970)

,

p. 60

"...the history of Marxism as a theory and practice
is marked by rather long periods in which formalism and/or
dogmatism predominate (the rise of the German Social

Democratic Party, 1880's-1914; Stalinism), punctuated by
rather brief ruptures (the new Marxism expressed by the
young Lukacs and some others in the early 1920 's; the New
Left in the 1960's). Arato and Breines (1979), p. 210.

12

The criticism of Lukacs and Korsch
was focused on two
positions regarded by orthodox Marxists
as central tenets
of the faith, one ontological and the
other

epistemological.

The ontological proposition was that
the

economic base determines the political, legal
and cultural
superstructure.
other words, that the forms

m

of

economic being mono-causally determine the other
forms of
social being.
The epsitemological proposition was that
being determines consciousness. This was embodied

in the

infamous formulation that consciousness was

a

reflection

of being, that the mind was a copy of reality.

In hindsight, the flaws of these positions seem

almost obvious.

For example, consider first the

ontological assumption.

The powerful Social Democratic

Party in Germany was engaged in battles to affect the

length of the working day, wages and unionization at the
same time it was maintaining the theoretical position that
its own activity, as a social and political organization,

was strictly determined by the base that it was in the

process of changing.

premised on

a

Secondly, their epistemology was

passive cognitive subject.

With

consciousness reflecting being, orthodox Marxism either
had to abandon the possibility of a class conscious

proletariat making its own history through revolution (and

13

fall back on the position that
a party elite could

engineer

revolution) or believe that revolution
was
automatic working out of the contradictions
of capitalism
with class consciousness as an automatic
result.
a

Ironically, Marxism had developed into
precisely the kind
of philosophical materialism that
Marx "had initially
found defective: passive, contemplative,
focusing

exclusively on the supposedly primary world
of external
"^^
nature.

In the orthodox view, the subject plays,
at best, a

very small role in his own history.
theoretical debate became

a

Broadly speaking, the

debate over the nature of the

subject, his ontological role in the creation of social

being and his status as a knowing subject.

In other

words, how does the subject constitute objectivity and

does the subject actively or passively come to know its

creation?

These questions require investigation into the

"active" side of the revolutionary equation: into the

problem of subjectivity, human nature and labor in the
constitution of social reality, and requires

a theory of

knowledge that transcended passive materialism.

Arato, Andrew, and Paul Brienes (1979), p. 214. These
authors are correct to note that Lukacs critique of Engels
and Kautsky was a close equivalent of Marx's critique of
Feuerbach's materialism.
'

14

currently the debate over Marx's
philosophical
assumptions has come to center on the
concept of labor.
Labor,

is construed by Habermas and
Wellmer as having an

instrumental meaning.

Marx's theory, which is in their

view latently positivistic and objectivistic,
is
compromised both morally and philosophically

by this

restrictive, instrumental concept of labor.

""^

The term 'instrumental' has played an important
role
in twentieth century social theory.

In Max Weber,

instrumental or formal rationality means the consideration
of the "relatively unambiguous fact that the action
is

based on 'goal oriented' rational calculation with the

technically most adequate methods" and, most importantly,
calculations are made "without regard to persons.

"^^

Instrumental rational social action is calculated,

efficient action.

Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse argued

that Weber's formal sociological categories contained

implicit value judgements.

Instrumental rationality

subtly turns into capitalist rationality, i.e., the

calculable efficiency of the capitalist enterprise.

Weber

argued that in Western society instrumental rationality
was invading all realms of society, politics, social

Wellmer (1971),

p. 125

and Habermas (1973), p. 281-2.

Economy and Society Vol

1.

(1978), p.

83.
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relations, art, architecture and
music, as efficiency won
out in competition with traditional
forms.

Agreeing, and tying this expansion to
the dynamics of
capitalist exchange relations, Adorno,
Marcuse and
Horkheimer argued that the 'rational' functioning
of the
social apparatus tends to abridge the
critical faculty of
reason in its place promoting instrumental
or subjective
reason.
Appropriate thought and action are then defined
by the objective requirements of the production
process.

They have "become completely harnessed to the
social
process... It is as if thinking itself had been reduced
to
the level of industrial processes, subjected to close

schedule

-

production.

in short, made part and parcel of
"^^

Habermas

•

claim that Marx's concept of

labor is instrumental is set in this context of meanings
and may be succinctly stated as follows: labor is social

action whose rationality is defined 'in toto' by the

requirements of the production process.

The 'telos' of

instrumental ly rational action is power over persons and
things; the ability to manipulate and control.

This fundamental inadequacy of Marx's concept of
labor Habermas viewed as the basis for the subsequent

Horkheimer (1974),

p.

21.
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bureaucratic and technocratic deformations
of socialist
theory and practice that are manifest
in Leninism and
Stalinism.
Wellmer, for example, claims that
a socialist
revolution conceived on the Marxian model
can only

lead to

an abrogation of liberal political
freedom in favor of
"dictatorial centralism" in which an elite
party organizes
a socialist state with the clearly false
view that social

freedom is

a

technical, bureaucratic problem.

Habermas

states the implications as follows:
The danger of an exclusively technical civilization
which is devoid of the interconnection between
theory
and praxis, can be clearly grasped: it is threatened
by the splitting of consciousness and by the
splitting of men into two classes the social
engineers and the inmates of closed institutions.^^

—

Outside the tradition of the critical theorists these

criticisms of Marx have been echoed by Charles Taylor.

He

has argued that Marx's work rests on an
uneasy,

if not untenable,

synthesis of romantic

expressivism and nineteenth-century science.

Accordingly,

Taylor claims, Marxists have adopted science, with its
epistemological telos of manipulation, as the method for

restructuring social relations.

Thus,

socialist planning

treats persons as objects to be manipulated, dominated and

controlled through the implementation of
human engineering.

(1973)

,

p. 282

a

technology of

"Marxist-Leninism began to be treated

.
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as a blueprint in the hands of
master builders rather than
the consciousness of a new age of
freedom. "^^

If one accepts the premises of
the above

interpretations of Marx, i.e., that Marxism
lacks a
normative foundation and is fundamentally
instrumental in
its orientation toward both objects and
persons, one could
logically conclude that Marx's theory is at
best morally
and ethically vacuous and at worst reprehensible
and

dangerous.

This implication is not lost on Taylor who

states:

...Marx's variant of 'absolute freedom' is at the
base of Bolshevik voluntarism which, strong with the
final justification of history, has crushed all
obstacles in its path with extraordinary
ruthlessness, and has spawned again that terror which
Hegel described with uncanny insight.
""^

Analogous arguments have, in the past, been derived
from different theoretical starting points.

One may start

from Marx's supposed determinism and conclude that the

theory fails to allow for human moral autonomy,
responsibility, and freedom.

Alternatively, one may start

from Marx's apparent lack of a theory of human nature and

claim that human beings are defined by their social

Taylor (1975)
Ibid.

,

p. 558

,

p. 522

18

relationships and are simply bearers of
social roles.
This can lead to the conclusion,
nicely characterized by
McMurty, that:
Since there is no human nature, then
the capitalist
society Marx opposes has no fault other
than
°^ productive forces, and the communist
^i^jf^'^''^
envisages has no human point other than
arnw^h^o^^
growth of such forces. Hence Marx's vision
is wholly
compatible with a communist society of
robotr^'^
This interpretation of Marx's lack of a
normative

foundation for critique, instrumental concept of
labor,
inadequate theory of human nature and finally of
a

presumed identity between Marx and Marxism leaves the
theorist with three possible alternatives.

First, one may

choose to reject or abandon Marxian theory as a confused,
absurd, dangerous and morally irresponsible body of

knowledge. ^°

Second, one may choose to limit the validity of

Marx's analysis (to the extent it is not completely
compromised) to a particular historical epoch, i.e., that
it is adequate to the period of liberal capitalism.

Piccone opts for this position.

While agreeing with the

above criticism of Marx's normative foundation and arguing

(1978)
20

p. 18.

,

•

•

•

...

Berlin (1957)
Historical Inevitability
Kamenka (19 62)
The Ethical Foundations of Marxism
see

,

,

.

,

and

.
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that the Frankfurt School theorists
failed similarly,
Piccone limits the validity of Marx's
theory to the period
of entrepreneurial capitalism,
the critical theory of
Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno to
a transitional stage,
and a "yet to be developed" theory to
the present period
of advanced capitalism.

The final alternative is to engage in
a

systematic reconstruction of Marx's theory, to
re-work it,
in order to preserve those remaining
moments of
truth, to

make it

adequate to an analysis of advanced capitalism

and most

importantly to provide

ground critique.^^

a

normative foundation to

This, broadly speaking, has been the

project of Habermas.

However, as we shall see, Habermas'

reconstruction is inadequate and largely determined by his
attempt to develop a theory of knowledge constitutive
interests rather than being determined by the object of
investigation: Marx.

Arato and Gebhardt (1978), p.xx.
I
discuss the logical structure of Habermas'
derivation of critique in language and Marx's grounding in
labor in the chapter 3

20

Haberma^ and the

Rec0n5.t-.rnnt-

^

of

M;.-rv-i.n

^v.^^

Habermas regards his work as being
within the Marxian
tradition and as a "reconstruction" of
Marxian theory.
With regard to the first point, Habermas
argues that his
investigations are 'materialist' in so far
as they analyze
crisis tendencies in the spheres of social
production and
reproduction. They are 'historical' because
of the
attempt to analyze causal relations effective
in ushering
in, maintaining and undermining
historical structures
of

consciousness and social being.

Regarding the second point, Habermas understands his

project as a reconstruction of historical materialism and

distinguishes between reconstruction, restoration, and
renaissance.

His approach to the many social theoretic

questions and controversies that have animated debate
among Marxists during the previous century is not
"dogmatic" or "philological."

His intent is not to

rediscover the 'real' Marx, whose theory had been

distorted and 'corrupted' by the vicissitudes of
subsequent adherents and epigones, though this is in
important respects the case.

The trap awaiting those who

seek to proceed in this manner is the tendency to view

Marx's works as a kind of bible, the exegesis of which
will provide correct answers to problems even where Marx's

21

writings are mute on the topic.

And while the study of

Marx's work has suffered from a
more or less hostile
intellectual climate in the Western
world,

it is not a

tradition long suppressed and buried
by the intellectual
and cultural hegemony of bourgeois
traditions.
Indeed,
announcements of the death of Marxian theory
have been
frequent but, nonetheless, premature.
Thus Habermas does
not view Marxian theory as being in
need of a renaissance.

Habermas defines his intention of "reconstructing"

Marxism as taking the "...theory apart and putting
it back
together again in a new form in order to attain
more fully
the goal it has set for itself.

"^^

whose potential is not exhausted.

it remains a theory

Marx's theory thus can

be said to be in need of reworking in order to be
adequate
to its task of liberating society from the domination
of

capital.

If Marxism is in need of reconstruction one

assumption can be made: the historical conditions Marx
sought to analyze have changed.

Thus Habermas

investigates the nature of these changes and their

consequences for Marxism.

The first of these changes is the relationship of

politics and the economy.

(1979)

,

p.

95.

The liberal capitalist
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separation of the state and society no
longer obtains in
advanced capitalist society. Rather,
the state and
society are closely intertwined. The
growth of capitalist
production outpaced the ability of the free
market
exchange of commodities to regulate production
and
distribution.
Capitalist development in its more advanced
states required greater administration in
production
planning, securing stable markets, etc., thus
superseding
some market functions.

At the same time, capital-labor

conflicts resulted in what Habermas calls the
"...political mediation of ... commerce

Thus he argues

.

that classical Marxist conception of the dependence of

polity on the base is no longer adequate for an analysis
of advanced capitalism.

Iri

Legitimation Crisis this point is elaborated.

A

clear example of the interdependence of base and polity is
the development, in reaction to endemic economic crisis,
of a

"quasi-political wage structure

.

"^^

The

institutionalization of capital-labor conflict through
union recognition by the state and the establishment of

a

new state function of managing wage negotiations shifts

a

portion of the reproduction of capitalist relations to the

(1973)

,

p.

195.

Habermas (1978),

p. 38
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state.

That is, the reproduction of
labor power as a
commodity and the price it receives
are determined by a
politically regulated class compromise.
One significant
result, beside a tendency toward
labor peace rather than
class conflict, is a flattening of
business cycles "and
transforming periodic phases of capital
devaluation into
permanent inflationary crisis with milder
business
fluctuations.

"^'^
.

.

A further, and often discussed example of
the changed
relation of polity and economy is government
subsidy by
either direct spending or tax expenditures of the

development of new technology such as nuclear power,
semiconductors and computers and new aviation
technologies.

Without government support through

procurement, assuming research costs, etc., the massive
capital accumulation required for competitive production

would be impossible through private capital market forces
alone.

One is led to conclude that judicious and

well-planned government intervention in the economy is
essential in advanced capitalism.

Whether the changed relations of economics and
politics in advanced capitalism requires a reformulation

Ibid.
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of Marx's characterization of
the notorious base/

superstructure relationship depends, of
course, on what
kind of position is either imputed
to Marx or argued to be
consistent with Marxian theory. As
Habermas recognizes,
there are three different accounts of
the base/
superstructure relationship.

The first, which one might call the strong,
orthodox
or economistic, version holds that there is
an ontological
priority of the base over the superstructure. in
this

version a social formation is conceived as a number
of
'levels'; the forces and relations of production
being the

foundation upon which the polity, law, and culture
(ideology) are built.

There is, as Habermas puts it, a

"causal dependency" of the "higher subsystems" on the
base.

This version, with its clear scientistic and

positivistic overtones has been under severe and cogent
criticism for decades.

Both Lukacs and Korsch, while

taking slightly different approaches, rejected this

version in the early 1920

's.

In orthodox Marxism, the

various phenomena of the superstructure, law, policy,
morality, and ideology acquired the status of a
'pseudo-reality' somehow less 'real'
'material') than the base.

(since less

As Korsch trenchantly puts it,

the economistic version "...can be formulated concisely,

with only

a

slight caricature, by saying.

..

there are three
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degrees of reality:

the economy, which in the last

instance is the only objective and totally
non-ideological
reality; 2) Law and the State, which are
somewhat less
real because clad in ideology; and
3) pure ideology which
is objectless and totally unreal ('pure
rubbish '). "^^

The weaker position is, in Engels famous phrase,
that
the base determines the superstructure only in
the final
analysis.

This more plausible version asserts that the

base sets limits or constraints on the development of,
and

actions by the agents in, the superstructure.

The third version, characteristic of Hegelian

Marxists and generally of the western neo-Marxist
tradition, is a conception of the totality of social

relationships which eschews an architectonic model of
levels of social organization.

This version, which

Habermas correctly ascribes to Lukacs, Korsch and Adorno,

conceptualizes society as

a

totality in which different

aspects, e.g., base, polity, etc., are defined by their

determinate interrelations with all other aspects.

Recently, structuralist theorists have

reconceptualized the base/superstructure problem in

Korsch (1970)

,

p.

82

a
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manner similar to the Neo-Marxists
undertaken in order to prevent

a

.

This change was

theoretically induced

blindness to the importance of social,
normative and moral
practices that characterized orthodox
Marxism.

The second change reflected in advanced
capitalism is
that capitalist exploitation no longer
coincides with the
abject poverty of the working class. As
Habermas states
"The interest in the emancipation of society
can no
longer be articulated directly in economic terms.
it:

•Alienation- has been deprived of its palpable economic

form as misery,

"^s

The horrors of the work place

documented so compellingly by Marx have been largely

mitigated by increased power of trade unions and
government regulation of the work place.

Although, while

the physical costs to labor have decreased, the psychic

costs seem to grow; physical pathology seems to have been

replaced by psychopathology

The third change, which is the logical consequence of
the "embourgeoisment" of the proletariat, is that its role
as the catalyst of revolution "...has been dissolved."

While the vast majority of the population is, by the
objective standard of class position, still proletarian.

(1973)

,

p. 195.
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as they do not own or control the
means of production, the

subjective conditions of class consciousness

"...especially a revolutionary class consciousness,
is not
to be found in the main strata of the
working class
today.

^j^^g

disjunction between object and subject,

which so profoundly influenced the Frankfurt
School, still
persists.
Even where critical thinking is alive
it lacks

an audience audience whose collective
self-deceptions, or

perhaps self-understandings, are well armored and
defended
against cries for enlightenment.

The fourth and final change Habermas notes is the

effects the Russian Revolution and subsequent

institutionalization of the Soviet state have had on

Marxian theory.

The Russian Revolution, Habermas argues,

originally had "no immediate socialist aims".

maintaining and expanding

a state

However, by

bureaucracy controlled

by a party elite, it was able under Stalin "to initiate

the socialist revolution from above.

"^°

The success of

the Soviet system, both in maintaining its territorial

integrity and in rapid industrialization, left it a

formidable world power that was seen as a threat to

existing capitalist states.

(1973)

,

p. 196.

Ibid., p. 197.
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Regardless of how one evaluates the course
of Soviet
history from the Revolution on, it is clear
that a

repressive state apparatus exists in the Soviet
Union and
it has no special exemptions from the
historical

requirement of all repressive states to legitimate
itself.
As this could only consistently be done using
Marx's
theories interpreted through Lenin's political practice,

Marxist-Leninism became

a

legitimating ideology

hegemonically and ruthlessly imposed on all spheres of
social life.

What Habermas calls a 'paralysis' of

discussion with and among Marxists is a result of the
institutionalization of Marxism in the Soviet Union and
the different theoretical trajectories that resulted from
the subsequent development of a "Western Marxism".

Epistemoloqy and Knowledge Constitutive Interests

In light of the four changes elaborated above,

Habermas understands his theoretical project as a

comprehensive reworking of Marxian theory in order to make
it adequate to an analysis of advanced capitalism.

This

involves a reconceptualization of not just the issues

discussed above but also such questions as: is the concept
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discussed above but also such
questions as: is the concept
of social labor adequate for
distinguishing between
humans and animals and what is an
adequate theory
of

social evolution?
end there.

Habermas

•

interests do not, however,

He has also reformulated
epistemological

theory in a manner that accounts logically
for the
interests that inform, or constitute,
knowledge.
Finally,
he has developed a theoretical construct
that can, he
argues, provide a normative foundation
for critical

theory— the ideal speech situation.

In Habermas' terms, Marx's theory is both

instrumental and emancipatory in its orientation.

It is

instrumental because Marx failed to understand his

theoretical assumptions completely thus miscasting his
theory in a scientistic manner.

Habermas' analysis, to

which we now turn, is designed to locate this tendency
within Marx.

Habermas' epistemological theory is as suggestive as
it is controversial.

He posits three knowledge

constitutive interests that are anthropologically deepseated: empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and

critical.

The interests which lie behind these types of

theory are technical control, practical understanding, and
emancipation, respectively.
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The empirical-analytic sciences
have as there
orientation the production of nomological
or law-like,
statements that are deductive and
predictive.
The
empirical sciences, which methodologically
detach the
subject from the universe of facts,
separate descriptive
from prescriptive statements and facts
from values,
,

functionally proscribe self-reflective knowledge
and
prevent the understanding of the social
constitution of
facticity

The hermeneutic method, originally developed as a

philological and historical methodology, differs

substantially from the empirical-analytical method.

Hermeneutics offers an approach concerned with the
explication of meaning and the interpretation of texts.
The interest of the investigator is not technical control
of natural processes but the understanding of cultural

phenomena.

Knowledge is achieved through the

confrontation of an interpreter, who necessarily brings
along his or her own baggage of pre-understandings

object of interpretation, such as

a

,

and an

text or work of art.

The result is a process of contextual analysis that issues
in a clarification of obscurities in the understanding of

the text and a more coherent interpretation.

which guides hermeneutic inquiry is

a

The interest

practical interest
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in sustaining traditional
meanings and the "preservation

and expansion" of intersubjectivity.

"The understanding

of meaning is directed in its
very structure toward the

attainment of possible consensus among
actors in the
framework of a self -understanding derived
from

tradition.

"-^^

Now while the social sciences have adopted
the
positivist goal of technical control through
knowledge of
the law-like regularities of social action,
one tradition
of social theory goes beyond that aim.

Critical social

theory remains profoundly suspicious of law-like

regularities in conduct when such regularities can be

demonstrated to be fetishized relations of domination
ideologically understood (or misunderstood) as natural
rather than social phenomena.

Individuals can be released

from such relations of domination because they are social

products and can, in principle, be transformed through

self-reflection undertaken to free

"...the subject from

dependence on hypostatized powers.

Self-reflection is

determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest".

(1971)

,

p.

310.

(1971)

,

p.

310.

32

Labor as InRtrnmpntal

Rf^^^^nn

The question can now be raised: how
does Marx's
theory stand in relation to Habermasepistemological
typology? Or, to state it differently:
what is the
epistemological status of Marx's theory?
Versions of
Marxist theory that have evolved into
legitimating

ideologies clearly exhibit instrumental and
positivistic
tendencies.
Habermas maintains that these scientistic

tendencies are, as previously noted, internal to
Marx's
theory.
But he also maintains that Marx's theory
is a

paradigmatic expression of
emancipatory intent.

a

critical theory with an

Indeed, he argues that critical

self-reflection is also part of the internal structure of
Marx's thought.

Thus, Marxian theory embodies two

apparently contradictory knowledge constitutive interests
Furthermore, we may assume that Marxian theory lacks the

practical interest in maintaining inter-subjectivity

manifested in hermeneutic and interpretive theory.

We

shall now turn to an examination of Habermas' analysis of

instrumental rational interest as manifested in Marx's
work.

I

shall begin with Habermas' discussion of the

theoretical linkages between Marx and the German idealist

3

philosophers.

in the

Economic^nd_P2^^

0^^844.'' Marx breaks with Hegel on
the question of the
identity of spirit and nature.
Nature is not the Mind
externalized. Rather nature, both
"objective and
subjective," is a substratum "on which
the mind
contingently depends".
Here the mind presupposes
nature, but in the sense of a natural
process that
"...gives rise likewise to the natural being
man and the
nature that surrounds him - and not in the
idealist sense
of a mind that, as Idea existing for
itself, posits
a

natural world as its own self-created presupposition".^^
In this fashion Marx sunders the presupposition
of

identity in Hegel.

Habermas concedes that what Marx advances against
Hegel is no crude materialism.

In other words, Habermas

does not attribute to Marx the simplistic reflection

theories of orthodox Marxism.

That he is no crude

materialist is indicated by Marx's first "Thesis on
Feuerbach"

wherein the concept of labor is revealed to

be not only an anthropological but an epistemological or

Marx and Engels (1975)
26.

(1971)

,

p.

(1971)

,

p. 26.

Marx and Engels (1976)
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knowledge-constitutive concept as well.
it is here,
Habermas argues, Marx's characterization
of man as an
objective being acquires the additional
meaning
of

constituting the possible objects of
experience.
Social
reality as it appears is subject to the
conditions of the
social production of possible objects of
experience.
History then is not the product of
transcendental
consciousness in general but rather of individuals
in
society producing and reproducing their
existence through
interaction with nature.

Social labor is for Marx a perpetual necessity of

human life and involves

a

"metabolism" between men and

nature through which nature can be appropriated in
usable form.

a

Because man is a natural being, this nature

includes subjective human nature and the nature of the

external environment.

Thus this material exchange between

man and nature is also

a

process of nature mediating

itself.

External nature loses its facticity and becomes

mediated by subjective nature through social labor.

This

gets at a basic point Habermas wishes to make: labor is an

epistemological category because the social appropriation

(1971)

,

p. 27.
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of nature both reproduces
society and the objectivity of
objects of experience that constitute
consciousness.

Habermas then states "The category
of man as a tool making
animal signifies a schema both of
action and apprehending
the world.
This indicates the appearance of
what is
the dominant theme of Habermasanalysis of Marx: social
labor is instrumental activity which
necessarily results
in an instrumental mode of
apprehending the world. The
adequacy of this analysis is the central
question

investigated in this work.

Habermas warns the reader of an immanent

"transcendental-logical"

error,

i.e., do not construe

labor, as have Marcuse, Sartre and Kosik, as
"world

constituting life activity in general.

"^^

The fundamental

importance of social labor is "...only as the category of

mediating objective and subjective nature.

It designates

the mechanism of the evolution of the species.

"^°

As defined by Habermas, the options are either to

construe labor in a restrictive manner or as
concept.

a

general

Indeed, here is the conceptual bind: labor is

instrumental and if it has any other apparent meanings or

(1971)

,

p.

28

(1971)

,

p.

28.

(1971)

,

p.

29
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levels Of meanings the interpreter
has made a philosophic
error.
Wherein lies the error: is it in
a philosophical
notion of labor as that which
constitutes history and
social being, or is it in the tightly
defined economic
definition of labor?

Habermas next raises the question of
a philosophical
anthropology. According to Marx, the
human animal
distinguishes itself by ensuring societal
reproduction
through social labor. Thus any anthropology
that fails to

comprehend human nature as a product of
historical

development should be rejected.

In Habermas- words

"...the human species is not characterized by any

invariant natural or transcendental structure.

The

evolutionary concept of the 'nature of man' unmasks
philosophical anthropology as an illusion.

..

Now, while Marx saw social labor as both constitutive

of social objectivity and social consciousness and further

that self-reflective consciousness could lay bare the
actual synthesis of subjective and objective nature, he
did not, Habermas claims, "arrive at an explicit concept
of this synthesis.

41

42

"^^

(1971)

,

p. 29

(1971)

,

p.

30.

Habermas' task then is to

37

reconstruct a materialist concept of
synthesis and
differentiate it from its meanings in
German Idealist
philosophy.

In contrast to Kant, Fichte and
Hegel, synthesis in
Marx is neither a function of logic nor
consciousness, but
a result of social labor.
The philosopher ought not turn
to logic, language or symbols, but rather
ought to look at

political economy and production.

"Synthesis no longer

appears as an activity of thought but as one of
material
production.
The model for the spontaneous reproduction

processes of society is the production of nature
rather
than those of

mind."^-^

In Habermas'

interpretation, Marx's concept of

synthesis retains something of Kant's distinction between
form and matter.

The difference is that the forms are not

ahistorical but rather reflect the contours of social
activity.

But the most Kantian aspect of Marx's theory,

Habermas argues, "is the invariant relation of the species
to its natural environment, which is established by the

behavioral system of instrumental

43
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(1971),

p.

31.

(1971),

p.

35.

action"^'^

38

The necessity of labor for
continued existence leads
to a fundamental, virtually
apriori structuring of thought
and action on instrumental lines.
This Kantian aspect of
Marx has its implications in the
pragmatic or
instrumentalist theory of knowledge
elaborated by Pierce
and Dewey.
This type of epistemology can
comprehend the
relationship of materialism and the natural
sciences
because "...the technically exploitable
knowledge that is
produced and tested in research processes of
the natural
sciences belongs in the same category as the
pragmatic
knowledge of everyday life acquired through
trial and
error in the realm of feedback-controlled action. ""^^

Whether knowledge acquired in everyday life can be
so
understood is open to question.

Less questionable,

however, is Habermas' claim that the obj ectif ication of

instrumental knowledge in the forces of production reacts

upon subsequent generations and thus affects the

development of new instrumental or technical knowledge.

There are, however, distinctly non-Kantian aspects to

Marx's theory.

As Habermas states it, Kanf's "...pure

apperception produces the representation

'I

think', which

must be able to accompany identically all other
representations, without this representation being able to

(1971)

,

p.

36.
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be accompanied by and reflected
by a further one."^^
Fichte's position goes even further by
arguing that

self-consciousness is achieved by abstracting
from the
content of thought while maintaining the
self as an
"identical ego." Thus, there is no primacy
to either the
ego or self- consciousness.
The ego comes into existence
through the activity of self-consciousness,
and neither
can be posited without the experience of being
that is
non-ego.

As "socially laboring subjects", individuals
confront
an environment (both social and natural) that is
formed in

the labor process.

Thus for Marx social consciousness is

formed by the historically existent forces and relations
of production as they have been formed by the activity of

preceding generations.

It is through the synthesis of the

labor process that the "species first posit (s) itself as a
social subject."'^''

With the discussion summarized above, Habermas places

Marx's position in the context of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
Marx rejects at least two of Kant's epistemological
assumptions; that of a "fixed knowing subject and that of

46
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(1971)

,

p. 37.

(1971)

,

p.

39
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the distinction between
theoretical and practical reason."
This is achieved through adopting
Hegel's critique. What
Marx does not adopt from Hegel is
the philosophy of
identity, that is, the assumption
that categories of
thought subsume the material reality
they purport to
explain without, as Adorno puts is,
leaving a remainder.
But Marx failed to integrate in his
"philosophical frame
of reference" structures of
communication, "symbolic
interaction and the role of cultural tradition,
which are
the only basis on which power and ideology
can be

comprehended.

"^^

Here, again, there is a degree of ambiguity
in

Habermas' application of his epistemological
typology.

Habermas contends Marx did not completely eliminate
symbolic interaction, intersubjectivity

,

and cultural

tradition from his analyses and in fact these aspects ar
evident in his practice of inquiry.

In other words,

although the concepts of labor and self-reflection are
both employed in his empirical studies Marx nevertheless
had,

in Habermas' view, a restricted philosophical

understanding of his "practice" in which self-reflection
is reduced to instrumental activity.

That is to say,

Marx's, or the materialist, concept of synthesis is too

(1971)

,

p.

42
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narrow to adequately comprehend
the dimensions of symbolic
interaction, tradition and the
critique of ideology.

Positivi sm in Marv

Marx's theory is thus unable to provide
a theoretical
basis for self-reflective knowledge
and, Habermas,
contends is therefore unable to prevent
a positivist
dissolution (or resolution) of a broad range
of

theoretical, but most specifically epistemological
issues.
"

The "immanent" reason for this failure is
the

reduction of the self-generati v e act of the

labor.

""^^

specie;:,

to

Despite the fact that Marx's

theory includes a systematic understanding of social
relations,

"symbolic interaction" and "cultural

tradition", these insights are not systematically

incorporated into his theoretical frame of reference.
This leaves Marx with a gap between his "practice of
inquiry" and theoretical self -understanding.

That is to

say Marx, in his work, accounted for labor, social

interaction and symbolic interaction, yet he still

misunderstands this practice and "interprets what he does

(1971)

,

p.

42.
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in the more restricted conception
of the species self-

reflection through work alone.

Habermas states his central claim
in the following
ways.
"Marx reduces the process of
reflection to
the

level of instrumental action.

.

.Marx conceives of

reflection according to the model of
production..." and
finally,

"Marx deludes himself about the nature
of

reflection when he reduces it to labor.

"^^

These characterizations indicate an implicit
problem

with Habermas' analysis: labor, instrumental
action and

production are each identified with the others.
I

One way,

suggest, to approach the question of the accuracy of

Habermas' interpretation of Marx is, therefore, to pose
the question: did Marx conceive of labor, instrumental

action and production as identical terms?

The analysis of

Marx in Chapter Two will investigate this question by
focusing on the conceptual structure that Marx employs.
By disentangling the meanings and levels of analysis of

labor through a reconstruction of Marx, further light can
be shed on this question.
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(1971)

,

p.

(1971)

,

p. 43

,
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One area in which Marx's
failure to distinguish
between labor and interaction that
has important
consequences is the question of the
distinction between
the natural and cultural sciences.
While failing to
address the logical status of critique
and science,
Habermas claims Marx did not eliminate
the distinction:IS
between the two. The ambiguity is
reflected
in Marx' s

clear intention of establishing

a

'critique- of political

economy versus his tendency to identify
his theory with
the natural sciences.

In Habermas' reading, Marx intends to
uncover "the

economic law of motion of modern society as
law'."

52

a

'natural

This interpretation is buttressed by references

to the epilogue to the Second Edition of Capital

appeal to the German Ideology

,

,

and by

which presumably shows that

even the young Marx held to this positivist position.

The

relevant passage from the German Ideology is: "Natural

science will eventually subsume the science of man just as
the science of man will subsume natural science: there

will be a single science.""

This passage, seemingly

ambiguous and Utopian enough, is in Habermas' reading

52
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(1971)

,

p.

45.

(1971)

,

p.

46.

a
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Clear call for a "natural science
of man" with
"astonishing" positivistic implications.

Through this interpretation of Marx's
attitude toward
the natural sciences and the relationship
of science to
industry, Habermas argues that the
production process
constitutes "the only framework in which
the genesis and
function of knowledge can be interpreted ... "^^
Thus Marx
subsumed the human sciences under the
categories of
instrumental knowledge for the purpose of control.

Knowledge of persons, social interaction etc.,
becomes
knowledge of the power of social control and
manipulation.

This is further evidenced, Habermas maintains, in
the

controversial passage on science and industry in the

Grundrisse der K ritik der Politischen Okonomip,
interpreted by Habermas, Marx here constructs

As

.

a

model of

social evolution in which social consciousness is

determined strictly by technological development.
"According to this construction the history of

transcendental consciousness would be no more than the
residue of the history of technology.""

The relevant

passage, as interpreted by Habermas, again realizes the
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(1971)

,

p.

47

(1971)

,

p.

48
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intention of the -early Marx- to
construct a natural
science of man. Habermas terms the
above reflections by
Marx rather unorthodox. That is
to say they are not taken
up in capital for which the Grundris^P
was a rough draft.
In other writings, Habermas contends,
Marx did not argue
that the development of technology led
to the liberation
of social subjects from domination
by capital.
in other
places "Marx very precisely distinguished
the
,

self-conscious control of the social life
process by the
combined producers from an automatic reaulatinn
of the

process of production that has become independent
of these
individuals "^^
.

This again points to Habermas' perception of

a

fundamental ambiguity in Marx's theoretical framework: he

sometimes views social labor (instrumental activity) as
the foundation of social consciousness, at other times he

recognizes that technological development of the

productive forces cannot lead to emancipation without self
consciousness.

Society may free itself from domination of

external nature through social labor and the acquisition
of technically useful knowledge but emancipation from the

domination of social institutions can only be achieved
through reconstructed social and communicative relations

(1971)

,

p. 51.
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that are "free from domination."

The latter can only be

realized through class struggle
and critical theoretical
reflection. The attempt by Marx to
capture these two
dimensions in the concepts of forces
and relations of
production was unsuccessful because
the meaning of
this -dialectic must remain unclarified
as
long as the

materialist synthesis of man and nature is
restricted to
the categorical framework of production."
sum, Marx's
materialist synthesis of Kant, Fichte and
Hegel is

m

inadequate for its failure to account for the
dimension of
"self-formation through critical revolutionary
activity.

"^^

Habermas contends that one must turn to the early

writings of Hegel to find an analysis of the dialectic of
moral life adequate to comprehend the dimension of social
and symbolic interaction.

On the basis of this moral

dialectic Habermas suggests that Marx could have analyzed

exploitation as a crime and revolution as morally
justified retribution imposing the

upon the rulers."^®
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(1971)
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(1971)
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It is not, however, a moral
dialectic that is the
center of Marx's critique of
capitalism.

Capitalism
relies not on religion for legitimation,
but on a secular
ideology of equal exchange in the
market.
Capitalism
justifies itself on the basis of this
socially produced
illusion that is manifested in the
consciousness
of all

classes.

The appropriation of the surplus by
the dominant
class in capitalist society is kept obscured
by the

commodification of all aspects of the reproduction
of
social life, including labor, and their exchange

in the

marketplace.

The development of productive forces, i.e.,

the objectification of social labor as manifested
in

tangible wealth, makes at least theoretically possible
the

recognition of the disproportionate relation of the

possibilities of social life to the actualities of
existent social life.

Reflection that can pierce the

illusions of commodity fetishism and grasp the disparity
of actuality and possibility takes the social form of a

class conscious proletariat and class struggle.

makes this point quite succinctly:

Habermas

"The development of

the forces of production at any time augments the

disproportion between institutionally demanded and
objectively necessary repression, thereby making conscious
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the existing untruth, the felt
disruption of a moral
totality.

On this basis Habermas argues there
are two

implications for social theory.

First, social theory is

"continuous" with self-reflective class
consciousness.
Second, social theory must recognize that
it is implicated
in the process it seeks to understand.
The epistemic

subject
itself.

"...must direct the critique of ideology at
"^°

In other words,

if the subject wishes to break

the spell of objective illusion, commodity
fetishism, and
the weight of cultural tradition, it must reflect
upon and

understand its formation in the context of the history
of
social labor and consciousness.

Habermas summarizes his critique of Marx in the

following way:
...if social practice does not only accumulate the
successes of instrumental action but also, through
class antagonism, produces and reflects an objective
illusion, then, as a part of this process, the
analysis of history is possible only in a
phenomenologically mediated mode of thought. The
science of man is critique and must remain so.^^

(1971)

,

p. 61.

(1971)

,

p. 61.

(1971)

,

p.

62.
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Emanci patory Interest in Mary

The epistemological status of Marxian theory,
as
previously noted, is not unambiguous. it is
instrumental
in its orientation as well as critical and

self -reflective.

While,

for Habermas, the natural

sciences are paradigmatic of an interest in technical
control, Marx's and Freud's theories are paradigmatic
of

emancipatory interest.

Marxism, as a form critical

theory, should have critical self-reflection built into
its very theoretical structure as well as specifying
the

historical conditions in which self-reflection is possible
and how self-reflection is blocked.

Thus the

methodological status of Marxian theory is qualitatively
different from the natural sciences and the

Geistwissenschaf ten

.

It is neither science nor philosophy

but somehow between science and philosophy.

The unique status of Marxian theory is described by

Habermas in the following passage:
Historical materialism aims at achieving an
explanation of social evolution which is so
comprehensive that it embraces the interrelationships
of the theory's own origins and application.
The
theory specifies the conditions under which
reflection on the history of our species by members
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possible^^^"6^2®^

themselves has become objectively

While it specifies its origins and applications,
it goes
further to specify the audience that it seeks to
enlighten.

This critical dimension separates it from the

"objectivistic posture" of the sciences and from the
"monologic" and contemplative forms of traditional

philosophy.

As noted above, the 'elevation' of Marxian theory

into dogma, and the historic confrontation of the two

world systems has distorted and frequently paralyzed

discussion and understanding of Marx.

In the United

States, the study of Marxism has flourished during the

last decade prompted in part by the experience of the
1960 's and the attempt to find a mode of analysis to

replace a discredited positivism.

This search has been

largely carried out within the academic division of labor:

Marxian economics, sociology, political science, history
and philosophy have all developed and flourished.

The

work within these fields however is not cut of the same
cloth.

There are significant and persistent divisions

between explicitly orthodox and heterodox theorists, the
implicitly orthodox, the philosophically inclined and the

(1973)

,

p.

1.
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empirically inclined.

Hence, an important underlying

issue of academic debate is whether
Marxian theory is
science, philosophy or critique.

To clarify this situation the theoretical
structure
of Marxian theory and its status as critique
must be

brought to light.

in a brief section Habermas examines

m

the historical usages of critique and crisis."

earliest forms, crisis and critique referred to:

l)

its

the

necessity of deciding a "dispute over right..." (Greek),
2)

"medical usage" (Roman), and

St. John)

.

3)

salvation (Gospel of

Early bourgeois theory was comfortable with the

concept of critique as it wished to demystify existing
feudal relations.

Feudal relations were dissolving on

their own and there seemed to be no concurrent societal
crisis to impel the process of critique.

With the advent

of Hegel's system, however, world history was
as a process of crisis ridden development.

conceived

But Hegel

failed to comprehend critique as part of that development.
In Hegel, philosophy formed its own self- enclosed

totality and saw itself as

a

synthetic process, superior

to the crisis, not involved in it.

Now, as Habermas

notes, Marx rejected this contemplative attitude while he

(1973)

,

p.

2
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was still a student/^

His own approach deliberately

restored the necessary relationship
between social crisis
and critique.
The exploitation of labor and
the crisis
ridden development of capital
provide the social basis for
the critique of political economy.

If,

in capitalist society,

economic factors hold

determinate power and act on society like

a

force of

nature, subjects must adapt to them
appropriately.

Marx's

theory, which understands this relationship
as the

domination of dead over living labor, or as

I

shall stress

latter, being over becoming, strives to demistify
the

relationship by showing it to be

a

product of social labor

under conditions of alienation and exploitation.

Herein lies the classic problem in the philosophy of
history: man makes history and can in principle know it,

but man is also made by history.

Habermas expresses this

as follows:

The historical subjects are... split up into their
noumenal and phenomenal aspects: they are the authors
of their history, but still they have not yet
constituted themselves as its subject they are at
once a causally determined species of nature and
morally free individuals.*^^

—

(1973)

,

p.

212f f

(1973), p. 246. Here Habermas is restating Adorno's
point thaf'Society is objective because it refers back to
the human beings who create it, and its organizational
principles too refer back to subjective consciousness and
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What Marx discovered was that what
reduces subjects to a
"causally determined species" is ironically
a product of
those subjects.
it is the domination of dead over
living
labor; capital over wage labor. Marx's
theory is

emancipatory in this centrally important way:
social
theory seeks enlightenment (in understanding
the
conditions of the domination of capital and in
explaining
why this domination is perceived as natural)
and
a

practical transformation of the social relations
that
reproduce this domination.

Conclusion

In the foregoing exposition of Habermas' critique of

Marx

I

have indicated several of Habermas' most important

and controversial points.

In sum, they are: social labor

is instrumental behavior.

It is a

'transcendental-

logical' error to construe it otherwise.

general category signifying life activity.

Labor is not a

Marx's

its most general form of abstraction - logic, something
essentially subjective.
Society is objective because, on
account of its underlying structure, it cannot perceive its
own subjectivity, because it does not posess a total subject
and through its organization it thwarts that installation
of such a subject." (1973), p. 54-55.

understanding of labor is: instrumental and
productive
activity imposed by the necessity of transforming
nature
into useful objects.

The instrumental appropriation of nature necessarily

entails an instrumental mode of apprehending the world.

Marx's instrumental ontology and anthropology implies an
instrumental epistemological theory.

Instrumental

knowledge is materialized in the forces of production and
each generation must appropriate that apparatus, adapt

themselves to its constraints, and alter it through new
activity.

This alienation of the collective social

product is the material basis of the claim that historical
subjects are both causally determined and morally free,

self-reflective individuals.

Marx's theory cannot account for self-reflection
since Marx conceives of self-reflection on the model of

instrumental activity.

Epistemological issues will tend

to be resolved in a positivistic manner.
a

This results in

behavioral explanation of consciousness and a

theoretical subversion of the possibilities for
self-reflection.

Thus, Marx is inclined to misunderstand

his theory as a kind of natural science.
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Whether this account is correct
or not, as noted
earlier, requires a detailed and
systematic study of
Marx's usage of the term labor and
its role in the

structure of Marx's theory.
above are:

l)

The relevant questions raised

is Marx's understanding of labor
restricted

to instrumental activity narrowly
defined;

2)

did Marx

hold that the genesis and constitution
of knowledge are
structured by instrumental activity);
3) did Marx
understand his work to be a kind of natural
science?

These questions, which will focus the analysis
in
Chapter Two, are subsumed by the more general
problem

concerning the nature of Marx's epistemological
assumptions.

is Marx's epistemology instrumental and

therefore positivist, or self-reflective and therefore
emancipatory?

If it is both, as Habermas seems to

suggest, does this represent an inherent flaw of lack of

coherence in Marx's theory, or does the problem lie in
Habermas

's

analysis of Marx and his application of the

theory of knowledge-constitutive interests?

It is to

these broader questions this work now seeks to address

through a reconstruction of the structure of Marx's usage
of the concept of labor.

What meanings does labor have in

the spheres of philosophical anthropology, ontology,

epistemology, and economics and what, if any, structure

can be found in the relationships between theoretical role
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Of labor in Marx and the
structure of his analysis o f

capitalism.

CHAPTER

II

MARX'S CONCEPT OP LABOR

Introduction

In this chapter

I

will examine Marx's work to

determine the cogency of Habermas

•

analysis.

As we have

seen, Habermas wishes to construe
Marx's concept of labor
in a highly restrictive way, i.e.,
instrumental activity.

will argue that this interpretation is not
simply wrong,
partial or inadequate, although to an extent it
I

is all of

these, but rather that it fails to account for
the complex

and diverse meanings and theoretical functions that
Marx's

writings evidence.

The concept of labor in Marx cannot be

subsumed by the concept of instrumental activity as

Habermas argues.

Ultimately, Habermas' account entails a fundamental

misunderstanding of Marx's critique of capitalism, and of
the structure of Marx's thought.

Indeed, it is Habermas'

failure to understand the structure of Marx's theory that
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makes his particular misinterpretation
of the concept of
labor possible.

Marx's theoretical structure is,

doubly bisected.

I

shall argue,

it is bisected first by the

appearance/reality distinction and, second, by
a
distinction between the metatheoretical and
historical
levels of analysis. ^6 Habermas analysis is
compromised
by his failure to take these distinctions
fully
•

into

account.

Thus, he takes Marx's account of the form
labor

takes in capitalist society and projects that
meaning into
the metatheoretical level.
By so doing, he obliterates
the distinction between the two levels of analysis
and

thus fails to see that there is

a

normative basis other

than capitalist, instrumental rationality underlying

Marx's critique.

I

begin by reconstructing Marx's assumptions about

human nature, ontology, epistemology

,

and economics.

The

first concern is to elaborate the meaning of labor in each

Because the historical level terms in Marx's theory
are themselves theory-laden,
that is are not simply
empirical, I have termed the more abstract level concepts
metatheoretical rather than theoretical.
This level of
concepts will be discussed more fully in Chapter III.
R.
P. Wolff [(1984), p. 114] makes a similar point arguing that
abstract homogeneous socially necessary labor is not a
descriptive concept in the sense that one can find it in
material available to the senses.
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Of these spheres.

evaluating Haberxnas
be asking

i)

This is the necessary first
step in
•

claixn of a univocal meaning.

i

will

how labor defines human nature,

2) how labor
constitutes the complex of relations
between the subject
and self (internal nature),
external nature, socially
produced objectivity, and others,
3) how the structure of
Marx's epistemological assumptions
reflect the distinction
between appearance and reality, and,
4) the meaning of
labor in Marx's economic theory.
The second concern is to
elaborate the structure of Marx's theory
vis-a-vis the
above mentioned distinctions.

AS noted, many Marx interpreters have
claimed to have
found some sort of split, rupture, dichotomy
or

contradiction.

Rejecting formulations of this sort,

I

propose to demonstrate rather far reaching coherences
among the various aspects of Marx's theory.

Generally, it

can be argued that a social theory is more plausible
and

persuasive when its assumptions made in one aspect cohere
with parallel assumptions in other aspects.

The greater

the number of coherences established, the greater the

power or explanatory force of a theory.

Connolly has

explained this criterion of coherence testing as follows:
In speculative theory, claims articulated on one
domain can be checked for their consistency. .with
assumptions accepted in others. Judgements reached
with confidence in one area can be brought to bear on
issues posed in more problematic or mysterious areas
of a theory... The more encompassing the theory, the
.

greater the variety of coherence
tests each nf
component parts must pass."^^

^

i-ho

The coherence of Marx's assumptions
in the different
spheres of his theory indicates
the inadequacy of the
various "two Marx(isms).. interpretations.
The coherences
established in the following pages
transcend
all

formulations that bear a family resemblance
to the young/
old Marx controversy and/or postulate
some philosophical
turning point in the evolution of his
thought.

Since Marx never wrote

a

philosophical work

expounding on his method, interpreters are
forced to
reconstruct his method and assumptions employing
a

hermeneutic exercise that most nearly resembles an
intellectual jig-saw puzzle.

Because most interpreters

have failed to recognize that Marx's theoretical
structure
is bisected by the appearance/reality distinction
and by a

historical and metatheoretical level of theory, the
resulting picture is, not surprisingly, contradictory.

As

we shall see, Habermas makes this sort of error when he

takes the historically specific observation that labor is
a

commodity and then projects the same meaning into the

abstract, or metatheoretical, level.

(1979)

,

p.

397,8.
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Finally, in approaching the
question of Marx's
assumptions it is common to explicate
them in relationship
to Hegel, i.e., the infamous
inversion of the Hegelian
dialectic and rational kernel inside
the mystical shell,
indeed, a substantial portion of
scholarly disputation of
Marx resolves itself into interpretations
of Hegel and
Marx's Hegel ianism. Robert Paul Wolff^^
has suggested
that a clearer understanding of Marx's
Capital can be

gained if we understand its structure as an
inversion of
the "Allegory of the Cave" in Plato's Republic
.

Plato's allegory is the most profound statement
of
the appearance/reality distinction in Western
philosophy,

albeit from an idealist perspective.

in Marx's reversal

of the metaphor one does not achieve enlightenment by

freeing oneself from the cave and escaping to the
sunlight. Instead, the light of the marketplace is itself

blinding. The marketplace itself creates illusions,
namely, that there rule freedom, equality, property and

Bentham.

This is the realm of appearances; a reality which
seems so clear and straight forward that participants in
it do not feel mystified and thus not in need of

(1980)

.
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enlightenment.

Marx's first job, like Plato-s
lover of
wisdom Who escapes into the
sunlight, is to convince his
audience that their marketplace
creates illusions. Thus,
Marx expounds at length on the
intricacies of commoditiel
and exchange.

Only then can Marx expose the
reality concealed
within those illusions.
"Reality lies behind the factory
door, within the dimly lighted
workrooms, where men,
women, and children are chained for
endless hours to

brutal machines.

m

the flickering light of that cave can

be seen the truth of capitalism.

I

"^^

suggest this analysis can be specified further.

I

argue that the structure of Marx's metatheoretical

assumptions (specifically the ontological and
epistemological) also reveal

a

kind of inversion of

Plato's assumptions vis-a-vis the realms of being and
becoming, objectivity (fixity) and subjectivity (motion).

Examining Marx's assumptions in this light will make
clearer the central role of the concept labor on the

metatheoretical level.

(1980)

,

p.

763.
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Labor in

M;.t-x's Anthr-npoi

...^y

in a biting aside in Capital
Marx pilloried Jeremy
Bentham, "a genius in the way of
bourgeois stupidity," for

advancing an ahistorical, reified and
one-dimensional
theory of human nature. Like the
"Robinsonades" Bentham
erred in assuming that human nature as
manifested in
,

nineteenth century England is the norm, "the
yardstick to
be applied to the past, the present and
the future." Marx
caustically notes if one wishes to discover what
has
utility for

dog "one must investigate the nature of

a

dogs," not deduce it from utilitarian principles.

Marx

goes on to say:

Applying this to man, he that would judge all human
acts, movements, relations, etc. according to the
principle of utility would first have to deal with
human nature in general, and then with human nature
as historically modified in each epoch. ^°

Interestingly, most of the discussion of Marx's

theory of human nature in the secondary literature focuses
on the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844

.

Struggling as he was at that point in his life with a
critique of Hegel, Marx's language is difficult and at
times rather tortured.

(1977)

,

p.

758,9.

While there are, of course.
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important insights into the
problems of philosophical
anthropology to be gained from a
close reading of thele
Manuscripts, perhaps Marx's clearest
and most conci=-se
single statement on the subject
is the quote cited above,
ironically, references to it in
the secondary literature
are virtually non-existent until
recently.
For
example,

Schlomo Avineri, in his classic work
on Marx with its
important contribution to the discussion
of human nature,
never cites it. John McMurty, on the
other hand, centers
his discussion of human nature precisely
on the

distinction between human nature in general
and as
historically modified.
Undoubtedly a large

part of the

reason for the focus on the early Marx to explain
his

anthropology has to do with the historical circumstances
of the discovery and release of the Manuscrip ts.

Published in the late 1920

's,

the immediately provided a

challenge to Marxian orthodoxy's general view that human
nature was little more than the sum total of existing
social relations: that consciousness reflects being.

''^

The Manuscripts provided Western Marxist with the needed

McMurty.
72

(1978), pp. 19-53.

the tone, style and substance of Herbert Marcuse's
essay "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," published
in 1932 evidence the profound impact the publication of the
Manuscripts had on theoretical debate and how they provided
ammunition for the Neo-Marxist critique of the Marxism of
the Second International. Marcuse (1972), p. 1-48.
,
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ammunition to challenge the
orthodoxy and, in fact, spark
a new intellectual movement:
Marxist Humanism.

The critical point as regards
this analysis is that
Marx quite clearly distinguishes
two levels of analysis of
human nature: -in general- and as
'historically modified'
or as I designate them in this
analysis: metatheoretical
and historical.

While the phenomenal record of
human

nature in history may seem to indicate
that it is dynamic
and seemingly infinitely variable, Marx
argues that one
can abstract certain valid general
statements.
What is
constant, as Avineri puts it, "is historical
creation as
constant anthropogenesis
On the metatheoretical
.

.

.

level certain characteristics may be ascribed
to human

beings: they are active, objective, natural,
sensuous and

social beings.
it:

And as the Marxist humanists would state

alienation represents the historical fate of human

nature under capitalism.

Marx tried to capture the

general determinants of human nature in five terms.

Humans are active (labor), objective, natural, sensuous
and social beings.

Avineri (1968), p. 85. This is probably Avineri's
most important contribution to the interpretation of Marx's
anthropological assumptions.

66

Marx Characterizes labor as

central determinant of

a

human nature and social relations.

Manuscripts that

He notes in the

virtue of Hegel's philosophy
is that it
sees the process of human
self-creation, alienation,
a

transcendence and the "dialectic of
negativity" as the
moving force in history. Hegel's
dialectic
is

preeminently

dialectic of labor seeking to
conceptualize
the objectification of labor in objects,
the
a

loss or

alienation and the transcendence of alienated
states of
being.
In an oft quoted line Marx states:
"Hegel's

standpoint is that of modern political economy.
labor as the essence of man..."^^

He grasps

But in Hegel, objects

never appear in their material aspect; they only
appear as

"consciousness or self-consciousness."

Human labor

appears only as the activity of self-consciousness and
in
an estranged form.

Thus:

"The only labor which Hegel

knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labor.

"''^

Human beings are capable, through their activity, of

objectifying their activity to produce objects.

Nature

supplies the materials in which labor becomes objectified
or realized.

In this sense labor is a relational concept;

it mediates between man and nature.

74

75

(1975)

,

p,

(1975)

,

p. 333

As a specific quality
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Of man's being labor allows

xnan

"to relate to the general

aspects Of objects and to the
possibilities contained in
them."^^ Every object can
become the object

of labor and
labor is the ability to transform
the given state of an
object to realize its latent
potential.
Labor is thus l)
a characteristic of human
nature, 2) a mediation of
subject and object, 3) transformative
in that the subject
can make-over objects and 4) capable
of obj ectif ication
through its -embodiment- in objects.
Human labor is the
material, sensuous presentation of the
subject,

i.e., the

subject -s self-creation.

The activity of human subjects, Marx argues,
is not
blind, random and chaotic but rather conscious,

intentional and form-giving.

The objects of labor

represent a subject -s conscious intentions or purposes.
This ability of homo sapiens ^Indicates qualities unknown
in other animals.

The products of labor represent

-...natural material transformed into the organs of the

human will over nature.

They are organs of the human

brain, created by the human hand, the power of knowledge
objectified.-''''

The labor process in general, the

metabolism between man and nature is a process of mental

Marcuse (1972)
(1973)

,

p. 706.

,

p.

16.
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and manual labor, of thought
and thought (rule, governed
activity.
in the labor process,
the result is conceived
prior to the activity and the
intended result "determines
the mode of his activity. "^^

Several important points should
be noted here.
First, Marx's position on
consciousness as a general
characteristic of human nature is one
that McMurty, for
example, refers to as "projective
consciousness"^'
and

I

refer to as rule and/or thought
governed activity.
Habermas wants to maintain that Marx
misunderstood the
concept of synthesis. Rather, Marx saw
that synthesis
a part of the metatheoretical
constitution
of social

labor.

For Kant, "...synthesis is rule-directed
mental
activity, "«° while for Marx, the synthetic
process is

labor with rule governed thought as an aspect of
that

process

Consciousness, and the language that structures

conscious understanding, is an integral element of the
labor process.

Therefore, the attribution to Marx of a

theory of the dependency of consciousness on the labor

(1977)

,

p.

284

(1978)

,

p.

23-30.

Wolff (1963)

,

p.

viii.

is

process, i.e., that it is
solely a result of the
labor
process, is false.
capitalist society, however,
conscious activity is not a
characteristic of laboring
individuals.
in effect, consciousness,
or .ental labor,
and work, brute activity
shorn of any connection to
projective consciousness, devolves
on different
individuals and social classes.
indeed this is the .ost
significant form of the division
of labor for

m

Marx.

m

primitive society consciousness
appears as a kind of
"direct efflux" of social life and
the division of labor
takes a spontaneous, "natural"
form.«^

However,

"Division
of labor only becomes truly such
from the moment when a
division of material and mental labor
appears. "^^ The
elevation of the division of mental and
material labor to
a principle of social organization
in capitalist society
has the profoundest consequences not only
for the

structure of the production process but also
for the
structure of social relations and ideology

(alienated

consciousness)

Second, consciousness, as Marx emphasizes constantly

the German Ideology, is as much a human product as a

commodity.

"Men are the producers of the conceptions.

(1975)

,

p.

36.

(1975)

,

p.

44,5.
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ideas, etc., and precisely

xnen

conditioned by the mode of

production of their material life,
by the material
intercourse and its further
development in the social and
political structure.
It should be clear that
consciousness, then, is not a simple
result of the
producer's economic, or productive,
or instrumental
activity, but rather it is conditioned
by a totality of
social relations.
Specifically, Marx argues
that social

activity is comprised of three aspects
"or, to make it
clear to the Germans, three -moments',
which existed

simultaneously since the dawn of history.

"^^

These

aspects are: production and the production
of new needs as
the first historical act, familial relations,
which in

primitive society are

a

dominant relation but which later

becomes a subordinate to other social relations,
and
finally consciousness.

Third,

it must be noted that conscious understanding,

the ideas and conceptions people hold may be both or

either real or illusory and may be either "fetters and
limitations" or enlightening.

science or ideology.

That is to say, they may be

When, as noted

above, a division of

mental and material labor obtains for society, it can

83

84

(1976)

,

p.

36.

(1976)

,

p.

43

71

become the case that consciousness
becomes both unmoored
from social activity and the
property and production of
the ruling class. When this
occurs one part
of the

dominant class becomes that
class's thinkers, -...its
active, concept ive ideologists,
who make the formation of
illusions of the class about itself
their
chief source of livelihood."

The social reproduction of

consciousness is then part of the
reproduction of
relations of domination and therefore
productive of
illusions and ideological justification
"of the very
empirical fetters and limitations. .which
move
.

the mode of

production of life, and the form of intercourse
coupled
with it."^^

In addition to being active, objective and
conscious,

humans are sensuous beings.

As Marcuse has argued,

sensuousness is "an ontological concept within the

definition of man's essence.

"^^

Marx's assumption is that

all human activity and knowledge must have, as a starting

point, sense perception and the orientation toward and

appropriation of objects by subjects is determined by the
historical character of the five senses.

85

86

(1976)

,

p.

45.

(1972)

,

p.

19.
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The textual indications are
that Marx held a broader
concept Of sensuousness that
included not only the sense
awareness of external objects
and nature, but also
includes conscious awareness of
the subject's body and the
perceptible needs and desires that
arise or originate fro.
that body. Marx held that sense
perception has
a

"two-fold form", external perception
and internal
perception or, as Marx phrased it,
"sensuous
consciousness and sensuous need". This
additional meaning
of sensuousness is evidenced by
Marx's inclusion of such
faculties as feeling, wanting and loving
in a listing of
sensuous relations.«^ Marx also refers
to the fact that
man's active "natural powers of life"
manifest themselves
"...

as tendencies and abilities—as instincts"
toward

external objects and these take the form of
passions or
needs. Marx's concept of sensuousness can be
summarized as
including 1) perception of external nature and socially

produced objects and

2)

is socially formed.

The conscious, sensuous activity of

internal, subjective nature as it

the subject, "each of his human relations to the world" is

constituted in the "objective orientation" and
"appropriation" of the object.

The actual history of the

subject's orientation and appropriation of self (as wage
laborer)

,

others and nature (as utilitarian objects)

(1975)

,

p.

299-300.

represent, Marx argues,
ontological relations in an
estranged, or historical for..
Here again Marx contrasts
"needs and enjoyment" in their
egotistical and utilitarian
form with a human, social
form of appropriation.

Finally, Marx defines man as a
social being who takes
other individuals as objects of
consciousness and
activity.
Human life is always "carried out
in

association with others.-^'

That is to say that social

life is carried out within specific
historical conditions
and the framework of a particular
social formation.

Again, the textual evidence suggests
Marx holds a
more complex concept of social being. He
is careful to
note that human activity, even in an estranged
form,

is

social and that the concept of estranged, or
alienated,

relations implies

a

concept of non-alienated relations.

Non-alienated relations, Marx argues, manifest themselves
as the need for a bond of unity between individuals
and

nature.

For example, Marx refers to the relationship between

man and woman as a natural and essential species

®^

(1975)

,

p.

299-300

(1975)

,

p.

299.

74

relationship.

Further,

from this relationship one
can

judge the nature of other
relationships.

indeed,

"one can judge man's whole level
of development
"^^^^^^ ^he extent tS ^hioh
mans ntl",^i.°"^t'''
the extent So
^
Sh?ch°^h^^%H^'=™^
which...
the other person as a person has
become for
exisTience i;'a?
exLLncf
is at

^"

hislndTeidSal

the'"'
the same time a social being. '°

The above passage is found in the
chapter of the
Manuscripts entitled "Private Property and
Communism."
This context is important for understanding
Marx's second
or metatheoretical level of meaning of the
concept social
The dominant theme and subject of analysis of
the

Manuscripts is alienation or estranged labor.

.

The

leitmotif of the chapter, "Private Property and
Communism"
is the supercession of alienation and private
property

through communism.

The conception of man as a social

being manifested as a bond or unity is elaborated as a

counter-concept in contrast to alienated relations.

In sum, Marx clearly distinguished two levels of

analysis in his discussion of human nature: in general and
as historically modified.

On the general, or

metatheoretical level, Marx characterizes labor as that

which links subject and object and creates social being.

(1975)

,

p.

296.
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He also points to a two leveled
meaning to the concepts of
sensuousness and social: each can
be understood in their
human form and in alienated
historical
forms.

indeed,

in

the early Marx, alienation represents
the general state of
historical being which sunders the set
of general
relations described above.

will now turn to a discussion of
Marx's ontology
focusing first on these relations in general,
I

or

metatheoretically, and then on the historical
forms they
take in capitalism. As will become apparent

in the final

section of this chapter, Marx's economic categories
are

systematic working out of

a

a

theory in which labor is

understood metatheoretically and historically.

Marx's Ontology

Traditionally, ontological questions have to do with

what is real, i.e., questions of being (objectivity) and

becoming (change)

.

Thought must attempt to reflect being

or articulate the relations between, and properties of,

things.

Thus it was generally held that ontology had

priority over epistemology
knowledge of being.

.

Being was held to be prior to
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Marx Clearly held certain
assumptions about ontology
in a philosophical sense,
but was just as certainly
unconcerned with exploring the
classical philosophical
questions such as the nature of
being
as such, or -in

itself,, or Why there is being
rather than nothing. His
ontological assumptions are oriented
toward answering

questions about social and historical
reality.
Marx's
concern was exploring the "practical
relations of everyday
life between man and man and man
and
nature."'^

However, Marx's concerns were not
completely divorced
from the more classical concerns of
philosophy. The
classical metaphysical concerns, such as
appearance and
reality, being and becoming, and being and
consciousness,

take on a palpable social dimension.

The problem of

appearance and reality becomes the problem of the equal
exchange and exploitation.

The problem of becoming and

being is transformed into understanding the active
laboring subject and socially produced objectivity and, in
capitalism, the alienated labor of the subject and

alienated social product.

The relation of being and

consciousness and questions of the priority of either lose
their abstractness to become the relation of alienated

(1977)

,

p.

173

social labor, socially produced

objectivity and the
social origins of fetishized
consciousness.

In speaking of the labor
process in general,
abstracted from its specific
historical form, one can
identify three aspects: 1) human
activity, or labor, 2)
the material to be worked upon,
and 3) the instruments of
labor.
In the labor process the
laborer employs the
instruments of labor, which are a
complex of tools that
"serve as the conductor of his
activity, "'^ to the

materials, which comprise the subject
of the labor
process.
The labor process is therefore
primarily
regulated interchange between man and
nature.

a

Man,

collectively and socially, appropriates objects
in nature
to subject them to the labor process so
that
he may

produce the use values necessary for continued
social
existence.
Human beings, who are themselves part
of

nature, oppose themselves to nature and bring to
bear upon
it their own natural and historically developed

capabilities in order to appropriate material from nature
and alter to a "form adapted to (their) own wants.

"'^

The

manner in which the stuff of nature, use values, enter the

production process (whether as raw materials or

92
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(1977)

,

p.

179.

(1977)

,

p.

177
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instrument), is determined
by the position it
occupies,
e.g., its function in the
process,
when a social product
enters into a new production
process it loses its social
character to become an objective
material factor
"contributing to living labor. "'^

Human labor is not identifiable
with the primitive,
instinctual forms of activity
manifested by animal.
Rather, Marx "presuppose
as exclusively human."

(s)

labor in a form that stamps it

what differentiates the weaver

from the spider or the architect from
the bee is that
weaver and architect produce an object
that they had
conceived of prior to the commencement of
the labor
process.
"What distinguishes the worst architect
from the
best of bees is this, the architect raises
his structure
in imagination before he erects it in
reality."

laborer must have

a

The

'practical' knowledge of the material

to be worked upon such that he can transform the
object
as it is given in nature to a state that is useful
to him.

The blacksmith, for example, does not simply appropriate

crude iron ore and subject it blindly to

a

series of

random processes in hopes of coming up with a horseshoe.
Rather, he makes use of the natural mechanical, physical

and chemical properties of the iron ore in rational.

(1977)

,

p.

289.

purposive ways to effect a
useful product.
"He not only
effects a change of form in
the material on which
he
works, but also reali.es a
purpose
of his own that gives

the law to his modus operandi
...

"^^

The objective factors of
production must be employed
by living labor so that the use
values of these elements
can be maintained otherwise they
would fall "prey to the
destructive power of natural processes.
iron rusts: wood
rots." But more importantly:
"Living labor must seize
on

these things, awaken them from the
dead, change them from
merely possible into real and effective
"'^
use values.

Strictly speaking the labor process is
an interchange
of subjective and objective aspects in
which subjectivity
in the state of becoming is transformed
into a
state of

being.

As Marx states it, labor passes "from the
form of

unrest into that of being, from the form of
motion into
that of objectivity."'^ Material objectivity then
is

socially produced.

By changing the form of a "piece of

natural material" the subject creates a use value and
labor has been objectified.
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Here again is another restatement of the nature of
rule governed, synthetic activity. (1977), p. 178.
(1977)

,

p.

289.

(1977)

,

p.

296.

the

o.^^^:^^z'^^^:^^^t^

°'
being, as a fixed, immobile
charact4rlstic!"f°''"

Alienation, as expressed in the
Manuscrrpts, is a
state of being which effects the
totality of the subject's
relations to objects, whether the
objects are the
individual's subjective nature, the
products of the
subject's labor, or others' labor, or
other subjects or
nature.
Marx viewed this complex of relations
as

internally related and thus the alienation
of the subject
from any one particular aspect of being
effects all other
relations.

Marx indicates this when he states:

"What

applies to man's relation to his work, to the
product of
his labor and to himself, also holds of man's
relation to
the other man, and to the other man's labor and object
of
labor.

Whereas Hegel had identified objectif ication and
alienation, Marx separated the terms.

Objectif ication is

(1977), p. 287. note here the clear contrast MArx
draws between labor as becoming and being, between labor as
unrest and its fixed, immobile form as being.
(1975)

,

p.

81

an aspect of human nature
and the result of activity
applied to material or nature.
Alienation is a

historically determinate, distorted
form of
objectification; a form which does
not affirm the
subject's ontological essence.
Alienation

thus is a form

of objectification which
results in an object that

"...becomes a power on its own
confronting him."^°o

The alienation of the objects of
labor result from
the social relations of capitalist
appropriation and in
this form represent, for the subject,
a loss of the
object.
The objectification of labor then
"appears as
loss of the ohi Pct and bondage to it ,ni°i
That the subject
must alienate his activity, by its sale to
the capitalist,
indicates the subjects alienation from self.
The workers
activity becomes a means to his existence rather
than an

affirmation of the subjects anthropological capability
for
conscious, intentional, form-giving activity.
Alienation
is then a state of social being.

100

/TOTcrx
(1975)

,

p.

(1975), p.
102

As McMurty (1978), p. 77) argues, alienation has an
objective nature.
"Alienation is not for him [Marx], as
contemporary usage mystifies it, some psychological malaise
peculiar to modern man, but a necessary material concomitant
of all private ownership of productive forces."

in sum, alienation
refers to the situation
that what
the laborer produces takes
on an existence independent

over and against the producer's
own existence and needs.
The fixation of alienated
labor as a social activity
creates a force which dominates
the producer.
This
domination has different aspects;
historical, social, and
epistemological

With respect to the historical
dimension, the
"fixated social activity" of
previous generations plays a
determinant role in the present. The
alienated
social

product,

"thwarting our expectations, bringing
to naught
our calculations is one of the chief
factors in historical
development up till now."^°^ Each generation
must

appropriate the productive apparatus, both
material and
cultural, and must adapt itself to it and
alter it through
new activity. For Marx, this is the real
constraint of
history:

History IS nothing but the succession of the separate
generations, each of which uses the materials, the
capital funds, the productive forces handed down to
It by all preceding generations, and thus, on
the one
hand, continues the traditional activity on
completely changed circumstances and, on the other,
modifies the old circumstances with a completely
changed activity.

103

104

(1976)

,

p.

47-8.

(1976)

,

p.

50

Earlier

noted that Marx's insight
into the classic
proble. Of freedo. and
deter.inis. in the philosophy
of
history lies in the recognition
that what .aKes subjects
into a "causally determined
species" (HaberxnasI

phrase)
ironically, a product of
those subjects. The
alienated activity of past
generations (of past production
cycles), active labor that was
transformed from unrest,
motion or becoming into fixed
material objectivity,
is,

or

being,

is manifested as the force
of dead labor over

living labor, or past labor over
present labor.

With respect to the social dimension,
Marx's analysis
of alienated labor goes beyond
economic relations simply
understood to the social relations that
constitute the
economic.
The relations between capital
and labor,

between capital, labor and commodities, and
even relations
between commodities are understood as social
relations.

The laborer, alienated from the means of
production and
the product, working under the control of the
capitalist,
finds himself in a society where social relations
become

thing-like and conversely, relations between things become
like social relations.

This occurs because capitalism forces people to

relate to one another through the mediation of money and
commodities.

All aspects of a person's existence are
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determined by the value of
the commodities possessed
and
Offered for exchange in the
market.
This includes their
class position, social status,
standard of living,
education, ability to satisfy
needs, power and frledom.
The laborer participates in
society as the owner of a
commodity, labor power, which
means simply
that he has

property in himself and can -choose,
to sell his ability
to labor.
The capitalist participates as
the owner

of the

objective factors of production.

Lacking only the subjective aspect
of the labor
process, the capitalist buys the
appropriate commodity,
labor-power, in the market.

For the capitalist, the

consumption of the commodity labor-power is
no different
than the consumption of any other thing (raw
material,

instrument) acquired in the market. As Marx
states it:

From his (the capitalist) point of view, the labor
process is nothing more than the consumption of the
commodity purchased, i.e., of labor power; but he can
consume this labor power only by adding the means of
production to it. The labor process is a process
between things the capitalist has purchased, things
which belong to him.^'^
On the metatheoretical level the process is, as noted
above, a dynamic of subject and object.

In speaking of

the labor process in general it was necessary only to

(1977)

,

p.

292
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delineate those factors
"co..on to all for.s of
society
we did not, therefore,
have to present the worker
in his
relationship to other workers;
it was enough to present
man and his labor on one side,
nature and its materials
on
the other..
The historically specific
conditions
of

capitalist production stamps the
labor process with its
own alienated forms i.e.,
separation from the means of

production and the necessity of selling
ones labor power.
The second distinction between the
historical and
metatheoretical levels in that in the
former, the
capitalist labor process, the intention
is to produce
surplus value, whereas on the metatheoretical

level the

objective is simply to produce a use-value.

Therefore, in

the capitalist labor process, labor is of
concern "only in
so far as it creates value... Here we are
no longer

concerned with the quality, the character and
the content
of the labor, but merely with its quantity

Finally, alienation has epistemic consequences.

Alienated objectivity, that is being that has taken on an
existence over and against its producers, constitutes the
ontological aspect of the epistemological phenomenon of
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(1977)

,

p.

290.

(1977)

,

p.

296.

fetishism.

Thi«^
inis,

as

t
I

r-v^^in
shall
argue in the following

section, evidences a significant
coherence in the
structure of Marx's theory that
.ay be stated as follows:
the primary epistemological
consequence of alienated labor
is fetishism and Marx's
conceptual structure not only
points to this but also explains
it.
As Marx states it:
"The objective conditions essential
to the realization of
labor are alienated from the worker
and become manifest as
f^^^^''^^ endowed with a will and soul
of their own.
commodities, in short, appear as the
purchasers of
persons".
i explore this issue along
with the issues of
1 0ft

appearance and reality, science and ideology
in the next
section.

Labor

in

Marx's EDistemolnqy

Some theorists hold that Marx's mode of thought

changed from philosophic to scientific.

Indeed Althusser

once argued that there was an epistemological rupture in

Marx's work.

And, as noted in Chapter I, Habermas has

argued that Marx conceived of his theory as a form of
natural science and therefore tends to resolve

(1977), p.

1003, emphasis in original.
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eplstemological issues in a
positivistio manner.
Habermas, like Althusser,
maintains that there

is a

significant break in Marx's
theoretical development.
Habermas argues that:
Marx himself immediately abandoned
the
anthropological model of labor as
externalization
which still furnished the standard
for ?he criMaie
'P^^i^ Manuscripts ^ and

labfr^^h^Sry'^f ^alul-o?-^-^- ^--<^ing\o

ih^

A result of this shift is the
categorization of the
human sciences as a natural science, the
point upon which
much of Habermas' interpretation rests.
Marx's social

theory becomes an instrumental theory with the
'telos' of
power, manipulation and control associated with
the

natural sciences.

Therefore the debate centers over what Marx meant by
science.

Both orthodox Marxists and Habermas seem to have

taken the dominant cultural meaning of science and

attributed that meaning to Marx.

As is common in the

debates over Marx's theory, a battle of citations has
failed to clarify the issue although those references

which tend to equate Marx's theory with the natural
sciences seem to have had greater currency than those

citations which express a more skeptical view of science.

Thompson, Held (1982), p. 255-6.
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Regrettably, in the discourse on
this question, citations
are used like philosophical
clubs.
Orthodox Marxists
wield the Club both to legitimize
their theory and to
bludgeon "petty bourgeois" Marxists
and assorted idealists
for failing the test of science.

For Habermas and Charles Taylor, and
anti-positivist
theorists generally, Marx's claim to be
scientific is

sufficient to undermine his philosophic
credibility or to
demonstrate that his theory is rent by an
irreducible

conflict between romantic and scientific
tendencies.

Marx's comments in the Postface to the Second
Edition of
Capital are ritually trotted out to demonstrate
Marx's
•scientism'.

The following quote from Capital

while

,

directed against Proudhon, may serve as a useful comment
on this debate:

"No school of thought has thrown around

the word 'science' more haphazardly than that of Proudhon,
for where thoughts are absent, words are brought in as

convenient replacements.

The controversy over science and Marx's

epistemological assumptions cannot be settled, or, if that
is impossible,

our understanding advanced, without a more

general reconstruction of Marx's assumptions.

110

(1977)

,

p.

161.

A
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determination of a position
consistent with that
reconstruction can then be made.

Paralleling the structure of his
ontology, Marx's
epistemology is bisected by the
appearance/reality
distinction. He thus necessarily
distinguishes between
science, knowledge of reality, and
ideology, knowledge of
appearances. Marx is rather blunt in
his description of
those he characterizes as vulgar
economists
or

ideologists.

These economists "flounder around
within the
apparent framework" of economic relations.
They do not
advance the science of political economy but
rather take
on the roles of popularizer and apologist.
Hopelessly

caught in the realm of appearances, these economists
...seek there plausible explanations of the crudest
phenomena for the domestic purposes of the
bourgeoisie. Apart from this, the vulgar economists
confine themselves to systematizing in a pedantic
way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, the
banal and complacent notions held by the bourgeois
agents of production about their own world, which is
to them the best possible one."^
In opposition, Marx defines classical political

economy as the analysis of the "...real internal framework
of bourgeois relations of production...""^

Marx is

essentially making a distinction between ideology and

(1977)

,

p.

174-5,

(1977), p. 174-5,

ftn.

ftn.

34.
34.

science.

Ideologists have as their
exclusive focus a
reified objectivity. Like the
unfortunates chained to the
bottom Of Plato-s cave, they
see only the "semblance of
Objectivity" and "ruminate" on
the relationships between
the various "social hieroglyphs"
that parade before them.
Marx's epistemology is connected
to his ontology in this
important sense: alienated products
of labor in exchange

relations come to take on a life of
their own and this
ontological situation has epistemological
consequences:
fetishism. Marx points to this in the
Grundrisse where he
states
"The bourgeois economists are so much
cooped
within notions belonging to a specific stage up
historical development that the necessity of of
the
obnectification of the powers of social labor
appears
to them as inseparable from the necessity
of their
alienation vis-a-vic; living labor.

Goods become commodities with all the mysterious

characteristics that come with the designation because
they are made by private individual producers who must

exchange them in the market.

"It is only by being

exchanged that the products of labor acquire a socially

uniform objectivity as values, which is distinct from
their sensuously varied objectivity as articles of

(1973), p. 832. Bourgeois thought, in other words,
cannot distinguish between objectif ication and alienation.

utility."-

The market functions to
establish social
relations between things. The
ever-changing value
relations between things in the
.arket move "independently
of the will, fore-knowledge
and actions of the
exchangers." The movement of
commodities then controls
the producers rather than being
controlled by them. The
form that commodities take in
this context is the value
form and this form has no relation
to the "physical nature
of the commodity and the material
relations arising out of
this.
It is nothing but the definite
social relations
between men themselves which assumes
here, for them, the
fantastic form of a relation between
things. ""^ Vulgar

political economy fails to penetrate this
necessary
illusion of objectivity but instead remains
bounded by it.

Fetishism is a "necessary" illusion, as opposed
to a
mistake, a simple error in thought or a delusion
motivated
by subjective desire, in that it results from the
material

relations of production of commodities for exchange in the

market by private independent producers.

Seeing through

this realm of false objectivity does not make it vanish
like a mistaken understanding when the truth is brought
out or a delusion when the impulse behind it is altered

(1977)

,

p.

166.

(1977)

,

p.

165.

9

through therapy.

The recognition of fetishism
and the
discovery that what underlies
this realm of appearances
the "determination of the
magnitude of value by labor
time" does not make this realm
disappear.
Rather,

i

^^^^lance of the merely
°^
magnitude of the
laU^t of
Tr ly.
'''i^''^^^^''
value
the products
of labor, but by no means
abolishes that determination's

acciden?ardL^^^'^^°r

^"^^

material ?orm!""^

The recognition of the law of value,
Marx states, "marks
an epoch in the history of mankind's
development, but by
no means banishes the semblance of
objectivity possessed
by the social characteristics of labor. ""^

In contrast to vulgar political economy,
e.g.,

ideology, science is the investigation of the
actual

social relations behind, or concealed within this

objectivity.

Having produced this objectivity men must

then "...try to decipher the hieroglyph.

..

for the

characteristic which objects of utility have of being
values is as much men's social product as is their
language.

"^^^

Several important points should be noted here. First
science, as Marx employed the term, is defined in

116

(1977)

^

(1977)

,

p.

167.

(1977)

,

p.

167.

-Lgg.

opposition to ideology and
within the fundamental
distinction between appearance
and reality.

Second,

science is not employed in a
way that suggests an identity
with the natural sciences
whether of a Comtist, Vienna

Circle or Popper ian variety.

Third, it is important to

realize that the term 'science,
was employed in scientific
socialism to distinguish it from
'Utopian' socialism.

It was not employed by Marx to
identify his theory with

the natural sciences.

Finally, when Marx employed the

term science, its meaning was
perhaps more akin to the
Hegelian nuanced term of wissenschaft
As Russel Jacoby
points out, the meaning of 'wissenschaft'
is inseparable
'

'

.

from history, and association most all
advocates of
science in its dominant meanings would have
considerable
problems.

"...scientific socialism. .was used in opposition
to Utopian socialism, which wants to attach people to
new
delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledap.
of th e social movement made bv the people itself ." (emphasis
added) Marx (1974), p. 337.
.
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"The Hegelian wissenschaft is not wider or larger
than the positivist science; rather it is impregnated with
history.
The natural reality and natural sciences do not
know the fundamental historical categories: consciousness
and
self-consciousness,
subjectivity and objectivity,
appearance and essence. .As object and method, Hegel's
Wissenschaft is saturated with history; this finally
constitutes Hegel's protest against the positive and
empirical sciences." Jacoby (1981), p. 22,23.
.
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Second, science involves
the dissolving of fixed,
objective forms of being and
analyzing the social
practices that constitute those
forms.
Knowledge is the
understanding of the process by
which labor in the form of
motion produces a fixed state of
being.
Knowledge of the
fixed forms of objectivity, in
contrast to Plato,
is

ideological and knowledge of flux,
motion and activity,
that is human activity or labor,
is science.

Third, there is no clear delineation
between science
(the science of classical political
economy) and ideology.
The practitioners of classical political
economy were not
immune from the influences of fetishism.
This is most
clear, Marx argues, in the failure of
Smith and Ricardo to

adequately explain the value form.

The value form is the

"most abstract" and "most universal form of
the bourgeois

mode of production" and reveals the "historical
and

transitory character" of capitalism.

By beginning its

investigations "post festum" political economy mistakes
that universality as an "external natural form of social

production."

Exchange value seems to be an immutable form

rather than a specific, historically conditioned result.
Put simply, political economy begins with socially

produced forms as given and natural and thus proceeds to

(1977)

,

pp. 168-74

read these forxns back into
history and project the.
into
the future.
Fetishism flattens out the
historical
dimension making it into a
projection of the present.

That such profound and
insightful thinkers as Smith
and Ricardo failed to penetrate
the nature of value form
yet were not ideologists poses
an interesting paradox:
they were seemingly both ideologists
and not ideologists,
scientists and not scientists. They
were not ideologists
in that their work and insight
were not confined to and in
the realm of appearances, i.e., they
were more than simple
apologists for the existing order. But
their thought was
regulated by some principles that resulted
in work that
was not completely free of ideological
consequences;
of

fetishism.

Scientific knowledge necessitates the resolution

o

material objectivity back into the ontological relation

subjectivity and objectivity.

The realm of being and

objectivity in capitalism, the alienated social product
must be understood as constituted by the realm of
becoming, that is by labor in the form of motion.

Reflection upon that objectivity begins, as noted
earlier, post festum.

The results of that history are a

given and the starting point for reflection.

Knowledge is

historically contingent in
that it is knowledge by
a
historical subject of a history
that presents itself as
a
set Of given, fixed congealed
forms the result of past
social labor.
Further, the active subject,
as a thinking
conscious being, theoretically
reconstructs that

history.
It is clear from the above
analysis that Marx's concept
of
labor is designed to get at the

classic philosophical

problem of the constitution of
society by the subject and
the fundamental intent of Marx's
theory is to abolish the
domination of capital. The realization
of that intent

requires a subject that can actively
investigate and
de-fetishize the 'natural- laws that
apparently govern
capitalist social relations seeing through
to their
underlying social constitution. Social
theoretic

knowledge cannot then be acquired by
subordinating thought
to objectivity.
The knowing subject does not view the historically

given conditions of his existence as brute data,
"a

collection of dead facts."

Rather, theory and speculation

are required both to see through false positivity
and "to

facilitate the arrangement of historical material

.

"^^^

To

phrase it differently, the ontologically active subject

produces a material objectivity through thought governed
labor, whereas the epistemologically active subject

(1976)

,

p.

37.
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reflects on that objectivity,
producing a scientifi c
understanding through mental
labor.
Marx does not assume
an epistemologically passive
subject whose thought is
simply the reflection of being.
simple reflection of the
sphere of being, i.e., socially
produced objectivity would
necessarily remain confined to
the ideological, to
appearances.

Marx not only assumes an active
knowing

subject but also, as Schmidt notes,
assumes the "relative
autonomy" of the cognitive subject

"in [the] face of its

object and, hence, does not simply
reproduce the
historical process of this object. "^^^

One further and important consequence
of this
analysis of Marx's epistemological assumptions

is that if

the subject is active in an epistemological
sense and is
relatively autonomous, then the future development
of

society is contingent on the forms of action taken,
and

understanding reconstructed, by the subject.

History is

not, therefore, the working out of any purely objective

tendencies or imminent ideal and is not teleological in
the broad sense of the word.

(1981)

,

p.

32
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or in Marx's

Fnnr.r.TT,^

Marx's economic categories
clearly exhibit the metatheoretical/historical distinction
On the metatheoretical level he elaborates the
concepts of labor, u se
value, concrete labor.
On the historical level, which
is
to say from the perspective of
the capitalist production
process, he elaborates the concepts
of labor power,

exchange value, abstract labor and
variable and constant
capital.

Marx starts Capital with an analysis of
commodities

which are the form in which wealth appears in
capitalist
economies.
The commodity can be viewed from two

aspects:

quantity and quality.
is a use value.

Viewed qualitatively,

a

commodity

Its usefulness is part of the object's

natural existence, its "physical body.

They constitute

the material content of wealth whatever its social form

may be."

1

25

In a sense, the analysis of commodities as use

values is an analysis from an ontological standpoint: its
reference is the object as

a

piece of nature containing

In this section the discussion is focused on the
metatheoretical/historical distinction because it is there
that Habermas' problems arise. While Marx's application of
the
appearance/reality
distinction
in
his
economic
categories is brilliant, it will not be examined here.
125

(1977)

^

126.

natural qualities.

First, the creation of
use values is

"an external natural necessity
which mediates the

metabolism between man and nature
and therefore human lif
"^26
itself.
second, use values combine
two elements,
material and labor, and third,
use values are created by
different forms of concrete labor.
The results of the
labor process in general in all
historical epochs "is an
object of utility. "127 Marx's intent,
however,
is to

analyze capitalist relations and to
dissect the forms of
appearance that capitalist production
brings to these
general relations: that form being
exchange
value.

Exchange value appears first as a
quantitative
relation that Marx describes as relative

and accidental.

If two qualitatively different use values
are to be put

i

relationship with the other, then clearly there must
be
something contained in the articles that allows an

expression of equality.

Obviously that something cannot

be a physical or natural property of the article.

Exchange value implies an abstraction from these useful

qualities and natural properties in which "all its
sensuous characteristics are extinguished"^^^

(1977)

,

p. 133

(1977)

,

p.

153-4.

(1977)

,

p.

128

In addition

the forms of useful labor,
concrete labor, are
extinguished.
Setting aside consideration

of use value
and concrete labor, the thing
underlying the exchange
relation is that they are
products of labor, "human labor
in the abstract." All
social and natural qualities

disregarded, commodities have left
only a "phantom-like
objectivity", a result of their
being "congealed
quantities of homogeneous labor",
i.e., value.
"The common
factor in the exchange relation ...
is therefore its value."
Furthermore, exchange value "is the
necessary mode
of

expression, or form of appearance, of
value.

"^^9

Value, therefore, arises out of the
objectif ication
(or materialization)

of abstract labor and the quantity
of

labor is measured by time.

The magnitude of value equals

socially necessary labor time which Marx defines
as
"...the labor time required to produce any use value
under
the conditions of production normal for a given society
and with average degree of skill and intensity of labor

prevalent in that society.

"^^°

The "substance" of value is

labor and the form of appearance of value in capitalism is

exchange value.

129

130

(1977)

,

p.

128

(1977)

,

p.

129.
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Use values acquire, or become
bearers of, value
through exchange by private,
independent producers. The
nexus Of exchange establishes
the social relationship
between producers and products
within the social division
of labor, and it is in this
sense that exchange value is
constituted by underlying social
relations.
As Marx
states it, again clearly contrasting
the two levels of
analysis:
"it is only by being exchanged
that the
products of labor acquire a socially
uniform objectivity
as values, which is distinct from
their sensuously varied
objectivity as articles of utility. "^^^ once
exchange is
generalized (such that producers produce for
the market)

labor acquires

a

two-fold social character.

First,

it

must be useful concrete labor, satisfy some
social need
and on that basis reproduce itself as part of the

social

division of labor.

Second,

it must become commensurate

with other forms of labor in other parts of the social

division of labor, i.e., it must become abstract labor.
Fundamentally, the equation of products through exchange

brings about the real equation of different forms of
labor.

"The production of commodities must be fully

developed before the scientific conviction emerges ... that
all the different kinds of private labor... are continually

131

(1977)

^

p.

155,
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being reduced to the quantitative
proportions of which
society requires them."^^^

Commodities do not go to market under
their own
power, rather they go along with
someone as his or her
property.
For commodities and their owners
to enter

into

relationships with each other their owners
must enter into
a juridical relation.
Commodities, as things,
are in

principle alienable.

For exchange to occur it is

necessary that each person treat others as
owners of those alienable things" and
are independent of each other."

2)

1)

"the private

as persons who

Marx characterizes this

relation as "reciprocal isolation and

f oreignness"^^^

and

as "atomistic"^^^ and fixes this form of relation
as

historically specific to the capitalist mode of
production.

The people who enter into these relations

play particular social roles which are conditioned by
economic relations, i.e. they are not simply free, equal,
legal owners but they are also capitalists or workers.

Furthermore, for goods to appear in the market they

must not be use values for their owner and they must be

(1977)

,

P.

168.

(1977)

,

P.

182

(1977),

P.

187.
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use values for their purchaser.

They must be exchanged t o

be realized as use values and
must be effective use val ues
before they are exchanged. Exchange
will determine
whether the concrete labor expended
was indeed useful
labor.

Money, Marx argues, is a necessary
precipitate of the
regular exchange process: it "crystallizes
out of exchange
because of the necessity of a universal
equivalent."

Utopian visions of commodity exchange without the
'evil'
of money are, Marx argues, foolish but
understandable.
They are foolish because to get rid of money while
leaving

commodity production untouched is like abolishing "the
pope while leaving Catholicism in existence

.

"^^^

Catholics

and capitalists would have to reinvent the pope and money

respectively.

Marx explained the riddle of the commodity and

money fetishes as objectively necessary illusions.

To the

participants in the marketplace, the exchange process
appears as natural and inevitable, i.e., as a fetish.

In

that money grows out of the exchange process and acquires
the appearance of having an intrinsic value, it acquires
an almost super natural appearance to the participants.

(1977)

,

P.

181.
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in fact the money fetish
is a fetish built upon a
prior
fetish: a sort of fetish squared.
Ultimately the super

natural qualities of »oney, whether
viewed as good by the
capitalists or evil by the social
reformers, are part of a
socially produced illusion that
arises necessarily out of
the regularized exchange process."'
Out of the universal
exchange process, or the circulation
of money and
commodities
...there develops a whole network of
social
connections of natural origin, entirely
control of human agents. Only because beyond the
the farmer has
sold his wheat is the weaver able to
sell his linen
only because the weaver has sold his
linen is our
rash and intemperate friend able to sell
his Bible
and only because the latter already has
the water of
everlasting life is the distiller able to sell
his
eau-de-vie. And so it goes on.'"^^
'

On the face of it, the capitalist goes to market,

spends money on those items needed for production, leaves
the market, goods in hand, returns to his factory and

produces a commodity which he then brings back to the

market and, with luck, sells for a value greater than that
spent in his original purchase.

"M-C-M^ is in

fact

therefore the general formula for capital, in the form in

which it appears directly in the sphere of circulation

136

137

138

(1977)

,

p.

187

(1977)

,

p.

207-8

(1977)

,

p.

257

.

"^^^
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The problem as summarized in
Chapter V of CaEital is: how
can a surplus (m') arise from
the exchange of equivalents.
"Circulation... creates no value""'
and certainly no
surplus value.

Marx argues that this incipient
capitalist must have
found something in the first exchange
(M-C)
that

subsequently allows him to realize a
surplus.

since

equivalents are exchanged for equivalents
in the market,
the surplus cannot arise out of exchange.
The capitalist
is fortunate enough to acquire in the
market a commodity
whose use value is greater than its exchange

value: labor

power.

Marx defines labor power as follows:

We mean by labor power, or labor capacity, the
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities
existing on the physical form, the living
personality, of a human being, capabilities which he
sets in motion whenever he produces a use value of
any kind.
As was pointed out above, labor or activity is a

central term in Marx's definition of human nature and his

explanation on the metatheoretical level of the

constitution of the social and historical world.
also indubitably

a

It is

perpetual necessity for the production

of the wealth (use values) necessary for continued social

139

140

(1977)

,

p.

266

(1977)

,

p.

270.

existence.

Labor power is introduced
to distinguish the
form labor takes in capitalist
production from its
metatheoretical determinants.
Put simply there has always
been labor.
But special historical
conditions must obtain
for there to appear in the
market labor for sale and thus
labor with an exchange value.
The aforementioned

juridical relations must be in effect
so that
an inalienable right to property

a

in his person,

person has
i.e., he

must have a legal self that is
continuous with but
separate from his physical identity.
The worker must be
free to sell or alienate his physical
and mental
capacities for a contractually delineated
period of time.
Further, the worker must be free to
continuously enter
into such contracts in the market. Most
importantly,

the

worker must have no other commodities to bring to
market
and must lack the materials and instruments necessary

for

production.
...this worker must be free in the double sense that
as a free individual he can dispose of his labor
power as his own commodity, and... he has no other
commodity for sale, i.e., he is rid of them, he is
free of all the objects needed for the realization of
his labor power. ^
In case it was not sufficiently clear that labor power is
a

historically specific concept Marx states:
...nature does not produce on the one hand owners of
money and commodities, and on the other hand men
possessing nothing but their labor power. This
^""^

(1977)

,

p.

272-3
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relation has no basis in natural
history nor does it
"^^^^
^°
P«ri°d^
ods of human
hiltory!""
The capitalist historical epoch
is distinguished by
the appearance (out of the
dissolution of feudal ties) of
labor power and that "in the eyes
of the worker himself
(labor power) takes on the form of
a commodity which is
his property.... .1^3 when this point
has been reached
(labor having an exchange value) the
commodity form has
become universal.

The capitalist, Marx argues, is fortunate
to have
found the one commodity, which, as noted above,
has an

exchange value which is less than the value it can
produce.

"Therefore the value of labor power, and the

value which that labor power valorizes, are two entirely

different magnitudes; and this difference was what the
capitalist had in mind when he was purchasing the labor
power.

Things look, and are, very different in the

capitalist production process.

What,

from the perspective

of the labor process in general, is a dynamic of subject

1^2

1^3

(1977)

^

273.

(1977)

^

274.

(1977)

,

p. 300.
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and object becomes, from the
perspective of the
valorization process, a functional
relation of things.
From the latter perspective, labor
power, means of
production, and raw material become forms
of existence
that are taken on by capital advanced
in its monetary
form.
Marx introduces two terms to refer to
these social
forms of existence in the valorization
process:
constant
and variable capital.
Constant capital is defined by the

condition that its value is not increased or
decreased in
the production process and is "turned into means
of

production; the raw material, the auxiliary material and
the instruments of labor...

"^^^

Variable capital is that

part of capital advanced that undergoes an alteration in

value during production.

"it both reproduces the

equivalent of its own value and produces an excess,
surplus-value, which may itself vary, and be more or less

according to circumstances.

"^^"^

On the metatheoretical level, the objective factors
of production take the form of constant capital and the

subjective factors take the form of variable capital.

Marx is quite clear that constant and variable capital are
particular historical forms of appearance of the

145

146

317.

(1977)

,

p.

(1977)

,

p. 317
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meatatheoretical concepts of objective
and subjective
factors of production.
^^P^^^'
the point of
view of the labor^ process,
view^ofthi^T^f
can be distinquished
respectively as the objective and
as means of production and labor subjective factors
power, can be
distinguished, from the point of view
of the
process, as constant and variable
capital!^^^""'
'

If what counts,

from the perspective of producing use

values, is concrete labor and the qualities
of the object,
then from the perspective of producing surplus
value what
counts is abstract labor and quantity. Abstract
labor is

pre-eminently a social and historical category.

More

accurately, it has as a referent the form labor takes when

subsumed by capital.

The reality of capitalist production

manifests itself as a tendency towards the reproduction of
labor as abstract labor.

What counts for the capitalist is quantity,

specifically a quantity of labor power measured by time.
"...Labor does not count as productive activity with

a

specific utility, but simply as value-creating substance,
as social labor in general which is in the act of

objectifying itself and whose sole feature of interest is
its quantities

Marx continually stresses that time

.

(1977)

,

p.

317

(1977)

,

p.

1012
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(duration)

is the crucial factor.

m

order to produce

surplus value, the capitalist
is compelled to use labor
power for a period of time in
excess of the time necessary
to produce value equal to the
variable capital advanced.
The capitalist advances variable
capital with the intent
of extracting surplus labor time.
On average it matters
not who is employed, i.e., that a
particular laborer can
perform specific kinds of skilled, concrete,
heterogeneous
labor, only that the laborer work the
full day.
As Marx
puts it in the Poverty of Philosophy, "we
should not
say

that one man's hour is worth another mans
hour, but that
one man during an hour is worth just as much
as another
man during an hour. Time is everything, man is nothing:

he

is at most time's carcass

Since abstract labor has been so widely misconstrued
some clarifications are in order.

First,

it is not, as

Colleti correctly notes, a simple theoretical
abstraction.
•

1

50

Rather, as a concept it refers to an

actual process of equating of different labors through

exchange and a form of labor that comes into being through

(1976b)
1

,

p.

127.

p.

84.".

sn

(1972),

..

'abstract labor'

is... far

from

being a mere mental abstraction of the investigator's", but
rather "...is one which takes place daily in the reality of
exchange itself
.

Ill

the particularly capitalist
mode of producing relative
surplus value.

A second, and related issue,
is that abstract labor
is not an ontological or
metatheoretical
category.

it is

not,

in other words, the type of
abstraction which is
valid for an analysis of production
in all historical

epochs.

Most recently, for example, Diane
Elson has
argued that abstract labor applies
to all historical

epochs and is a "valid abstraction"
(of the type Marx
employs) that fixes a common element
in all modes of
production.
it is incumbent on those advancing
such a

position to demonstrate the existence of abstract
labor
in,

for instance, the feudal mode of production.

The

peasant, while producing on his own time for
his immediate
needs, is clearly engaged in concrete labor, i.e.,
the

production of use values, without any involvement in an
exchange network.

His labor is concrete, heterogeneous,

and structured by the needs of the family and the specific

obligations to provide specific quantities of use values
to the lord, or surplus labor.

Surplus labor can, of

course, be measured by time, but that would be

insufficient to justify the inclusion of compulsory labor
in the category of abstract labor.

More to the point is

whether one serf's labor time could be treated as the
equivalent of another serf's labor time from the
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perspective of the lord.

That is, would it make any

difference if serf A's labor were
replaced by serf B's
labor? on one level the answer
is it makes no difference
because one serf can probably
repair as many yards of road
as another.
But it makes all the difference
whether the
serf prescriptively obligated to
perform the
labor

actually performs it.

The feudal system is structured by
relations of
personal dependence based on prescriptive
rights, duties,
and obligations that are particular to not
simply the
occupant of a social role but to specific individuals.

Ultimately, a lord's failure to enforce specific

obligations due could result in those obligations being
voided.

To allow the interchangeability of labor would

threaten the core of the feudal mode of domination.

""^^

In the final analysis, the difference between

feudalism and capitalism lies in essentially incomparable

modes of domination, or to use Marx's terms, supremacy and
subordination.

The difference lies in the manner by which

More related objections can be raised. The serf's
obligated labor time does not result in the production of
commodities, i.e., the lord is not a capitalist.
He may
sell some of his surplus to acquire money to purchase luxury
goods and contribute thereby to the development of
capitalism but he does not exploit the different magnitudes
of the exchange and use-value of labor power.
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surplus labor is appropriated:

surplus labor is extorted."

"...the method by which

Marx notes two relationships

that formally distinguish the
subsumption of labor under
capital.
The first is: "The pure money
relationship
between the man who appropriates the
surplus labor and the
man who yields it up..."^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^
^^^^^^
(legal) equals and both are free and
unencumbered by any
prior or underlying constraints whether
social, political
or religious.
As against the feudal mode of production,
what brings the seller of labor power into
a position of

dependency "is solely the fact that the buyer is
the owner
of conditions of labor"^"
What is decisive here, Marx
repeatedly emphasizes, is that the mode of domination
changes its form.

"If supremacy and subordination come to

take the place of slavery, serfdom, vassallage and other

patriarchal forms of subjection, the change is purely one
of form.

The form becomes freer, because it is objective

in nature, voluntary in appearance, purelv economic

.

"^^^

The second distinction is that the objective factors
of production and the means of subsistence confront the

(1973)

,

p.

1025.

(1973)

,

p.

1025.

(1973)

,

p.

1028
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worker as capital, or as "alien
property."^" These
essentially legal conditions
formally establish the
relations of capitalist to worker,

i.e., capital to wage

labor,

Again, labor, when subsumed under
capital, becomes an
"instrument of the valorization process "^^^
In the labor
.

process in general the subjective
conditions of
production, labor, utilizes the objective
conditions.
Capitalism inverts the metatheoretical relation
between
person and thing, person and nature, subject
and

object.

Thus:

"

Capital utilizes the worker, the worker does
not

utilize capital, and only articles which utilize the

worker and hence possess independence
a

,

a

consciousness and

will of their own in the capitalist, are capital

.

"^^^

In

keeping with the discussion of fetishism above Marx
further notes that this inversion "has become an

inseparable part of the physical character of the elements
of production both in capitalist production itself and in

the imagination of the economists."

So much so, in fact,

that when Ricardo "...deems it necessary to give an
ana lysis of the physical elements of capital, he naturally

(1973)

,

p.

1026.

(1973)

,

p.

1019

(1973)

,

p.

1008

without scruples or reflection
of any kind .akes use of
the correct economic
expressions
Marx continues by
noting that Ricardo understands
that capital is something
that employs labor, not the
opposite.
.

This is indeed the central
point with regard to
Habermas- analysis of Marx's concept
of labor.
The issue

may be stated as follows: Habermasclaim is that Marx
holds that labor is instrumental,
by its nature, a thing
to be utilized in a rational,
efficient way.
I have
sought to demonstrate by the above
exegesis that Marx's
analysis shows how labor becomes an
instrument when
subsumed by capital.

We have been discussing the "formal" subsumption
of

labor under capital.

That is to say the two conditions

elaborated above represent the necessary pre-conditions o
capitalist production.

When these conditions obtain, the

specifically economic relations of domination of the
capitalist mode of production, capital over wage labor,
are effective.

These conditions may obtain regardless of

the technology of the production process.

In other

words, a guild master may become a capitalist without

altering the traditional technical production process

(1973)

,

p. 1008,

ftn.

18.
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although certainly the social
relations of production will
be altered.
All things remaining the same,
the guild
master turned capitalist will
generate surplus value
through the mechanism of absolute
surplus value,

i.e., the

lengthening of the working day beyond
the time necessary
to produce a quantity of commodities
of value equal to the
variable capital advanced. However,
when this new
capitalist revolutionizes the mode of
production through
the application of the social forces of
production
(science and technology) to the labor process,
he

initiates what Marx refers to as the "real"
subsumption of
labor under capital.
"The real subsumption of labor under
capital is developed in all the forms evolved by
relative,

as opposed to absolute surplus value.

"^^'

The capitalist now increases surplus value by

shortening the period of necessary labor time rather than
by lengthening the period of surplus labor time.

With

this development "... capitalist production now establishes
itself as a mode of production sui generis and brings into

being a new mode of material production."

It is crucial

to note here that this new form of large scale manufacture

presupposes the direct application of science and
technology.

The penetration or transformation of old

(1973)

,

p.

1035.
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production process occurs on

a

scale that "beggar(s)

comparison" with precapitalist
and early capitalist
production.
Individual capital becomes social
capital,
and this tendency manifests
itself in a drive to take
over all spheres of industry
"where only
formal

subsumption obtains.

"^^°

Marx's view of the relation of science
to industry is
important given the logic of Habermas'
analysis.

The

development of the process of relative surplus
value
necessarily entails revolutionizing the means
of

production.

The impetus for this is inherent in the

nature of the constraints on the capitalist.

The desire

to increase surplus value through absolute surplus

value

reaches certain natural limits in the length of the

working day: the laborer must have some time to reproduce
his labor power.

The capitalist, unless he is also an

inventor, scientist, and engineer and thereby capable of

revolutionizing the means of production through his own
efforts, must rely on the general socialized knowledge of

the sciences and bring that knowledge to bear on the

problems of increasing the scale of production thereby
reducing necessary labor time.

The capitalist's desire to

do so will be greatly enhanced when he realizes that such

(1973)

,

p.

1035-6.
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techniques could lead to super
profits vis-a-vi.s other
producers using older techniques.

Although they are lengthy, Marx's
comments on this
topic are worth quoting in their
entirety.
The social productive forces of
labor,
productive forces of directly social^ or the
sociaUzed
'

bein^II^^^

co;p;ra?lir^H""'
cooperation, division of labor within
the use of machinery, and in general the workshop
the
°^ production by the conscious use of
^^r^^?""""^^^""
the
sciences, or mechanics, chemistry,
etc for
specific ends, technology, etc. and
similarly
increase of scale corresponding
^o^^^lf
H S
to
such
developments (for it is only socialized
labor
that IS capable of applying the general
poducts
of
human development, such as mathematics,
o the
immediate processes of production; and
conversely
progress
these sciences presupposes a certain
level of material production)
This ntire
development of productive forces of socialized
labor
(in contrast to the more or less isolated
labor of
individuals)
and together with it the use of science
(the general product of social development)
in the
immediate pro cess of production takes the form of
productive power of capital
it does not appear
as the productive power of labor, or even of
that
part of it that is identical with capital. And least
of all does it appear as the productive power either
of the individual worker or of the workers joined
together in the process of production. The
mystification implicit in the relations of capital as
a whole is greatly intensified here, far beyond the
point it had reached or could have reached in the
merely formal subsumption of labor under capital. On
the other hand, we here find a striking illustration
of the historic significance of capitalist production
in its specific form the transmutation of the
immediate process of production itself and the
development of social forces of production of
labor.

m

.

,

,

,

.

—

(1977)

,

p.
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in early capitalist
production, the relation of
science to industry was sporadic,

un-coordinated,

nonsystematic.

with the real subsu.pt ion of
lablr through
relative surplus value, Marx
emphasizes that science
is

consciously used, and brought into
systematic relation
with industry.
Further the mystification that
inheres in
capital acquires an additional
dimension: science then
participates in fetishism inasmuch as
its application
to

production and ultimately its further
development appears
as (and indeed is) a function of
the needs of
capital.

Marx elaborates further on the relation
of science
and industry in the Grundrisse and carries
the logic of
the analysis one step further.^" There he
notes that an
automatic system of machinery represents the most
adequate
form of capitalist development. At this stage
there are
some interesting implications.

First, workers serve as

"conscious linkages" and function primarily as
superintendents.

The machine, which possesses accumulated

social knowledge and skill, is no longer the means that

labor employs i.e. it does not transmit the laborers'

activity to the raw material.

Second, the machine then

appears to act purposively, not labor, and the machine is
thus the producer of use values.

(1973)

,

p.

690-712.

Labor becomes "a

mere
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abstraction of activity," that
activity being governed by
the requirements of the
automatic system. And, as Marx
notes in the paragraph reproduced
above, science becomes
an alien force due to the
separation of mental and manual
labor.
"The science which compels the
inanimate limbs

of

the machinery, by the construction,
to act purposefully,
as an automaton, does not exist
in the worker's

consciousness, but rather acts upon
him through the
machine as an alien power." Third,
when capital reaches
this stage of development, Marx presciently
notes that
science itself becomes an industry.'"
Ultimately "living
labor (is) subsumed under self-activating
objectified
labor."

Being,

in other words,

subsumes becoming.

Marx goes on to note that the reduction of necessary
labor time through the mechanism of relative surplus
value
"...will redound to the benefit of emancipated labor, and
is the condition of its emancipation.

"^^^

He also argues

that through this process capitalism, and value theory, is

undermined.

Surplus value derives from the appropriation

of labor time.

"But," in

Marx's words,

to the degree that large industry develops, the
creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labor
time and on the amount of labor employed than on the
(1973)

,

p.

704.

(1973)

,

p.

695

(1973, p.

701.
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ana on the procrress of
application of th?s Ll^ncf to

i^'-itiiioe

Hq^kv,^!

prodSS>°^

Marx then draws out the logical
implication: labor
time "must cease to be" the
measure of wealth and exchange
value of use value. The whole
system of production for
exchange value is undermined by the
very processes which
it brought into existence.
Capital, which turned both
subject and object into "mere means"
for the production of
surplus value, makes the production of
wealth, quite
unintentionally, "independent (relatively) of
the

labor-time employed on
has historical limits.
argument,

it."^^^

Here again value theory

Here, the logic of Marx's

in a sort of closure,

suggestively speculates on

the dissolution of the social relations that, through

their own historical dynamic, brought the logic of the

domination of value into being.
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(1973)

,

p.

705.

(1973)

,

p.

706.
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ConclllRi nn

In the foregoing

I

have first stressed the

fundamental importance of the
appearance/reality
distinction and metatheoretical
and historical levels of
analysis in structuring Marx's
theoretical assumptions.
Second, I have suggested that
Marx's ontological,
anthropological, epistemological

,

and economic assumptions

and analysis are fundamentally
coherent.

Third,

I

have

argued that the concept of labor has
differing 'functions'
and levels of meaning in the various
spheres of analysis.
Fourth,

have argued that the concept of labor
is
theoretically central in the philosophic sense
that a
materialist social theory must proceed on the
basic
I

insight that labor in the form of motion (becoming)

creates the fixed forms of objectivity (being).

On this basis

I

will argue, in the concluding

chapter, that Habermas' understanding of Marx's concept
of

labor is severely restricted and fundamentally inadequate.
This has consequences for Habermas' subsequent claim that

Marx lacked

a

normative basis sufficient to sustain his

critique of capitalism.

While sympathetic to Habermas' desire to link

epistemological and anthropological issues and place them
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on a new footing and, while
agreeing substantially with
the claim that "Marxism"
(as a legitimating ideology)

resolves these issues in a
positivistic manner, I will
argue that Marx does not so
resolve these issues and in
fact holds certain counter-factual
normative assumptions
arguably sufficient to his critique
and, importantly and
ironically, virtually identical
to those derived by
Habermas from the ideal speech
situation.

CHAPTER

III

HABERMAS 2^D MARX

Introduction

Habermas- analysis of Marx, linked
as it is with a
broad range of issues, is extraordinarily
complex and
ambitious. As we have seen, his central
claim is that
Marx understood labor to be exclusively
instrumental

activity.

And again, as

I

have noted above, the

conseguences for Marx's theory are manifold.
theory

1)

Marxian

is a form of positivism as it models itself

after the natural sciences;

2)

reduces all spheres of

human activity to instrumental activity specifically

reducing communication and interaction to labor;
best ambiguous with regard to epistemology

,

3)

is at

that is while

it claims to contain an interest in emancipation it

reduces knowledge to the instrumental.

After a brief summary of the analysis of Marx in
Chapter II,

I

will discuss the possible justification of

the metatheoretical level of analysis.

The guestion is:
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just what constitutes a
rational abstraction, and
conversely, what constitutes
a bad abstraction?
i will
then turn to the central
question of this work: can
Habermas. analysis of Marx's
concept of labor be sustained
on the basis of the evidence
brought to bear through the
reconstruction of Marx above.

The final two parts of this chapter
will examine the
implications for the question of the
normative foundations
of critical theory.
The most important implication of
Habermas- line of analysis, and the
implication which
animates both Habermas theoretical
project and
•

considerable controversy in contemporary
political theory,
is the related claim that Marx lacked
a normative
foundation adequate to his critique of capitalism.

I

will

examine the implications of this critique of Habermas
for
this issue of normative foundations and discuss the
norms

Marx employed to ground his critique.

Marx clearly makes metatheoretical assumptions about

human nature and justifies these as necessary and rational
abstractions.

Most important for the evaluation of

Habermas' position is the notion of the subject as an

active (laboring) being.

Marx defines humans as active,

natural, objective, social, sensuous and conscious beings.

Activity, or labor, is

1)

capable of objectif ication,

2)
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mediates subject and obiect
ujjjecT:,

J)

"makes over" irs
its Object),
nh^or-l-^

social,

6)

a\

4)

is of both mind and body.

transformative (in that it
i-r-=.r,c-P

•

-,

5)

rule governed, and

Regarding the last point,

activity, on this level, is
not simply the brute
expenditure of energy. Activity
also refers to mental
activity.

On the ontological level, Marx
places the active
subject in a complex of relations
that connect the subject
to nature (both internal and
external), socially produced

objectivity and others.
relations.

Labor serves to mediate these

Put philosophically, becoming (labor
in the

form of motion)

,

through the rule governed appropriation

of nature (internal and external) produces
being (the

objectivity and fixity of objects and social
relations).

On the epistemological level, Marx makes one

assumption that is crucial for our purposes: the subject
is epistemologically active.

This again is consistent

with Marx's descriptions of consciousness (as in the
Manuscripts when talking of human nature) and labor as
thought governed, conscious, intentional and form giving

activity (as in Capital when talking of the labor process
in general)

.

Furthermore, it is consistent with the

position that it must be an active thinking subject that
demystifies social reality by working through
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theoretically the objectively
necessary form of
appearance, or illusions, created
by capitalist
production.
For this is the only basis
on which the
domination of labor by capital
can be overcome.

Marx's economic theory, on the
metatheoretical level,
points up the relations between
the subjective factor
(labor) and the objective factors
(tools and material) of
production abstracted from any particular
social
formation.
Labor is here concrete, heterogeneous,
rule
governed, lacks any separation of design
and execution or
mental and manual labor, is connected
to subjective needs
and constitutes social relations for
that purpose
and for

social reproduction, and transforms its own
nature in the
process.
This continuous process of making and
re-making
the objectivity of things and social relations
throughout

time is history and thus the dynamic of history is
the

activity of the subject.

History is labor in the form of

motion or becoming as it is constrained by the material
objectivity of past labor.

If the concept of labor is to be adequate to the

theoretical task of linking anthropology, ontology,
epistemology, history and economics, then it must

necessarily be construed broadly enough

1)

to cover the

range of modes of human social expression from economics
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(work), art, religion,
science, the family, politics,
love, and language and
2) be capable of definition
on both
the metatheoretical and
historical levels of analysis.
a
.etatheoretical level of analysis
requires a

broad concept
Of labor While the historical
level requires a concept

that specifies concrete social
relations.
Marx claimed
that social activity is made up
of three aspects,
production, family, and consciousness,
all of which are
the result of the constituting
activity of subjects.
Hence it is that Habermas- claim that
Marx's concept of
labor applies only to the economic
level and
is

exclusively instrumental is not adequate
to either Marx's
writings or the logical structure of Marx's
theory, at

least, thus far in our analysis on the
metatheoretical

level

Let us now turn to Marx's historical level analysis.

With the rise of capitalist social relations, the

structured relations described above still obtain but
assume alienated and fetishized forms.

The subject's

activity becomes something that must be sold on the
market: thus, alienation from one's self through the sale
Of labor-power.

The subject becomes alienated from the

social product through the imposition of capitalist

property relations.

External nature and the social

product become a material objectivity that confronts the
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subject as an uncontrollable
force.
The subject's
potential sociality beco.es
restricted by a legal syste.
Of individual rights,
private property, and economic
competition leaving only the
impoverished,

atomistic and

utilitarian social world of Bentham.
must come to embody a mind/body

Finally, the subject

duality,

for not only is

mental and manual labor split into
different spheres of
the division of labor, but the
subject must hold to a
conscious identity as a free being
while not having the
freedom to not sell his activity, or
labor-power,

to the

capitalist.

The subject necessarily comes to see
the body

as a thing to be utilized by capital.

Capitalist

relations demand that the subject maintain
the mental
identity of a free subject and a physical
identity that is
instrumental

The set of ontological relations are similarly

structured in a contradictory manner in capitalism.

The

subject produces an objectivity that controls rather than

being controlled by the subject.

The social relations

that arise out of the social organization of labor become

subsumed under capital and take the commodity form.

This

reacts back upon the subject's consciousness in the form
of fetishes that arise out of alienated and rigidified

social and productive relations.
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Epistemologically, while the active
subject
constitutes the universe of
objects and relations and the
forms (language etc.) through
which these are known, these
forms are objectively necessary
illusions: appearances.
The domination of capital over
labor (being over becoming)
creates rigidified forms of
conscious understandings that
are ideological and hence that
functionally obscure the
subject's knowledge of history and
the real process of the
constitution of society by labor.

With the labor process subsumed by
capital, concrete
labor becomes abstract labor, heterogeneous
labor becomes
homogeneous, labor becomes a commodity and
the subject's
attributes become the capitalist's, production
is for

exchange and the production of wealth becomes
the

extraction of a surplus through exploitation.

Marx's

theory is a historical explanation of the appearance
of
labor as a commodity and all the implications that this

appearance has for social theory.

He attempted to capture

these implication in the economic concepts he elaborates
as the labor theory of value.

Because Marx's theory

operates on both the historical and metatheoretical level
and with an appearance/reality distinction it can hardly
be correct to claim that he treated labor as purely

instrumental activity.
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R ational Ahstrnrtlon

anri

The ory in ^^n^.-.i

Marx never systematically and
explicitly discussed
the justification of the
metatheoretical conceptual
structure.
There are, however, enough textual
clues to
make a theoretical reconstruction
possible. Thus we can
reconstruct arguments for the validity
of metatheoretical
concepts; arguments that are consistent
with those Marx
used.

For example, Marx argues that it is
proper to
abstract from specific historical forms
of production and
to speak of production in general
He deems this a

"rational abstraction" because it delineates
those

relations common to all forms of production.
said so little on this subject,

I

Because Marx

will quote him at

length.

Production in general is an abstraction, but a
rational abstraction in so far as it really brings
out and fixes the common element and saves us
repetition.
Still, this general category, this
common element sifted out by comparison, is itself
segmented many times over and splits into different
determinations. Some determinations belong to all
epochs, others to only a few.
[Some]
determinations will be shared by the most modern
epoch and the most ancient ... There are
characteristics which all stages of production have
in common, and which are established as general ones
of the mind: but so-called general preconditions of

(1973)

,

p.

85.
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llLllTTtr^^ni Trill Mst ^'^-.^•^-^ -^^tract
production can be grasped"^"
^'"^^ ^^""^^ °^
In Capital, Marx again
discusses the abstract
elements of the labor process.

inte?actLn"bIt5^^^
nat

condition for the metabolic

-I pL^n:-,?irS?

^L^^'t^'^

society in which human beings
liveJ^°
Marx always notes in these
passages

that, as abstractions,

these concepts do not provide
knowledge of particular
things or relationships, in fact
remain empty until
brought to bear on historical material.
Marx goes on to
note
The taste of porridge does not tell
us who grew the
oats, and the process we have presented
does not
reveal the conditions under which it
takes place
whether It is happening under the slave-owner's
brutal lash or the anxious eye of the
capitalist,
whether Cincinnatus undertakes it in tilling
his
couple of acres, or a savage, when he lays
low a wild
beast with a stone"^^
'

If what characterizes a rational abstraction is
that
it fixes certain determinations of labor or the
subjects

that are common, universal and necessary (in the sense of

indispensable to the practice of social theory)

(1973)

,

p. 85, 88.

(1977)

,

p.

290.

(1977)

,

p.

290.

,

the
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question arises: what
characterizes a "bad" abstraction?
Marx offers two examples
of bad abstractions.

The first Marx calls a
process of forgetting. He
argues that one must take care
not to confuse those

particular determinations which
have developmental
significance with those that are
common and

universal.
This can lead, as we shall see,
to fundamentally
ideological conclusions. Capital,
which obviously has had
the profoundest developmental
impact on
society,

Marx argues, a valid abstraction.

is not,

Marx criticizes

political economy precisely for the
error of seeing
capital as a valid abstraction. His
argument is as
follows: all will agree no production
can take place
without an instrument, which is nothing but
stored up
labor.

Capital, which is an instrument of production,
is

also objectified labor.

"Therefore capital is a general,

eternal relation of nature; that is, if

l

leave out just

the specific quality which alone makes 'instrument
of

production' and

•

stored-up labor' into capital.

"^^^

In

such a view the stone flung by the savage at a wild beast
is capital.'"'^

The forgetting Marx refers to is blindness

(1973), p.
^'^

86.

"By a wonderful feat of logical acumen. Colonel
Torrens has discovered, in this stone of the savage, the
origin of capital." (1977), p. 291.
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that results tro. using
the process of abstracting
as a
fxlter.
This type of bad
abstraction is essentially a
fonu Of reification involving
historical amnesia and has
the ideological result
of concealing the historical
and
social relations that determine
what form the instrument
takes.
As Marx puts it, "The
whole profundity of those
modern economists who demonstrate
the eternity and
harmoniousness of the existing
social relations lies in
"^^^
this forgetting.

The second type of bad
abstraction Marx notes are
those abstractions which are
chaotic or too indeterminant.
It may seem scientifically
correct to begin investigation
"with the real and concrete. .with
eg the population,
which is the foundation and the subject
of the entire
social act of production." Upon reflection,
however,
.

population proves to be an empty concept of
the whole.
"The population is an abstraction if

classes of which it is composed.
are an empty phrase if
on which they rest.

i

I

leave out... the

These classes in turn

am not familiar with the elements

E.g. wage labor, capital,

etc."^^^

The journey would have to continue until we discover the

determinants of wage labor and capital, such as exchange

^''^

(1973)

,

p.

85.

(1973)

,

p.

100.
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value, labor power, division
of labor and property
for
example.
Population proves to be only
an apparently
concrete point of departure.

Furthermore, we should note
that Marx considers th.
le
abstraction 'labor- as an
historical result. while he

notes that the conception of
"labor as such" is of ancient
origins, as an economic conception
its origins are in
modern, capitalist productive
relations.
if one examines
the history of economic thought
one finds wealth variously
attributed to, in different historical
periods, money and
land.
With Smith, and modern political
economy the source
of wealth is seen as labor, in
"subjective activity."
As

Marx puts

it:

"As a rule, the most general
abstractions

arise only in the midst of the richest
possible concrete
development, where one thing appears as common

to many, to

all.

Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular
form

alone.

"^^^

The abstraction "labor" is thus not simply the

result of thought, but also of the concrete relations
of
labor and production in capitalism which are in fact the

practical basis for the validity of this abstraction.
"Not only the category, labor, but labor in reality has

here become the means of creating wealth in general, and

(1973)

,

p.

104.

has ceased to be organically
linked with particular
individuals in any specific
form."

There is one further type
of abstraction, or more
properly, process of abstraction,
that Marx criticizes:
that is the method of speculative
idealism that he
critiques in Th^Holy_Famil^
a brief section on the
"absolute fruit" Marx parodies
the method of German
Idealism, which appears profound
and mystifying when the
subject is Geist, by bringing the
method to bear on a more
mundane subject. One apparent
contradiction should
.

m

be

kept in mind at this point. Though
Marx does not recommend
this procedure as a mode of philosophic
reasoning, and
indeed finds it absurd when it is brought
down to earth.
Yet, Marx seems to reproduce this mode
of speculative

abstraction in the opening sections of Capital

.

In order to clarify this point, let us look at
the

specifics of these arguments.

The following, Marx argues,

is the method of speculative idealism.

philosopher contemplates
case, particular fruits.

a

First the

collection of objects, in this
From this he concludes that the

abstraction "fruit" is valid.

He then comes to think of

the abstraction "fruit" as something that exists

independently of himself and the particular fruits.
then thinks that the abstraction "fruit", real and

He

independent as it is, fo^s
the "substance" of real
particular fruits which are
only semblances of the
substance.
Next, he begins to wonder
how it is that the
"absolute fruit" manifests
itself
in the forms of

particular fruits, i.e., how
apples are the instantiation
of the "absolute fruit."
The speculative philosopher
sees
in every particular fruit
substance, of the Absolute

Pru?i-^"°S''"^*'°^

Is"io-di^lSeir*?l
fruits Which have

l^ft^'i^^^'^

specSi^^Ln

a'h^^f .^I^i^^.^^f-i.^^^^-

^^""^ °' Your lrlTu kn^
not out':? ?hrmar^'°f ^"^^
earth... when you return from
thl abst?fction ^hf'^^
'^"P^rnatural creation of the
mind "the FrS?;"

^

.

on"?Ae^tL^rftAe^na^rril^f^i---,ire
sh^^rr'""^

abltrfct^Sns.""?

The parallel between this critique
of speculative
idealism and the logic of Marx's argument
in the beginning
of Capital is interesting.
Marx seems to employ the same
logic that he ridiculed in The Holv FamUy
To draw out
this parallel let us imagine, instead of a
philosopher, a
.

political economist.

Instead of fruit, let us imagine the

economist in contemplating different labor processes such
as spinning, weaving, tailoring, smithing, etc.

We know

these to be different forms of concrete labor but our

political economist sees the possibility of making the

(1975b)

,

p.

59.

138

abstraction 'labor'
laiDor

Let us suppose that he
begins taki ng
the same logical steps as
the philosopher, i.e., he
concludes that -labor' exists
independently of the actual
subjects performing the concrete
labor and that what is
important is not labor in its
concrete form but the
abstraction labor. The concrete
labor he began with now
becomes the particular manifestation
of abstract labor,
spinning, weaving, tailoring,
and smithing
T^^t-

.

become

instanciations of abstract labor
which becomes the
substance of value. Actual labor
becomes abstract and
acquires supernatural significance
in the labor theory of
value.
Now if this mode of thinking is
silly when
employed by the Left Hegelians what makes
it valid for the
political economist?

Part of the answer to this question has already
been

provided above in Chapter II.

That is, the social

relations of capitalist production make labor abstract.

Exchange relations make different, particular forms of
human activity equivalent by bringing them into relation
in the market and constituting their value.

What is

involved here are actual social practices of production
and exchange

— real

social relations.

While an orange can

never become the instanciation of the absolute
fruit,

labor in its concrete form labor can, when subsumed

by capital, become the instanciation of abstract labor.

Marx ™akes this point in an
oft overlooked passage
in
Capital
.

thelLs, whL the
produSe^s o? coat;':'^"?'
^^^^^
^^^^^ commodities
in?o a relation
?
^'^^^^
(and klt'll^Ts no
difference^ii^^er'as^?^
'

-latio^beteeertkirown^r^^^
l^b'^^'T;.""^
labor and the collective
labor of society appears to
them
exactly this absurd formJ^«
coats, boots, and linen, as real
objects, are no more
equivalent than oranges and apples,
but real social
relations can make all of these objects
stand

m

in

relationship to each other and give them
an exchange
value.

This line of reasoning can provide

a

clue to what

Marx meant when referring to the rational element
of the
Hegelian dialectic. In this respect, the hidden
validity
of Hegel's logic is that it accurately captures
the

objective insanity of capitalist relations.

The insanity

of capitalist relations became the hidden core of Hegel's

philosophical method.

As philosophical method it is

problematic, but as philosophic insight into the human

condition in the modern world it is insightful.

Hegel's

mistake, as Marx viewed it, was to elevate and transform
the logic of capitalist social reality into the logic of

(1977)

,

p.

169.
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method.

Quite si.pxy, the method
of HegeLs speculative
idealism mirrors the
uae actual
ari-ii;:^i
o^^^
social
processes of
capitalism.
t

A Critique of H^H^>-mri^

Let us now turn to an
evaluation of Habermas- claims
regarding Marx's concept of
labor.
His central claim is
that social labor is instrumental
behavior imposed by the
necessity of transforming nature
into use values.
light of the foregoing analysis
and reconstruction of

m

Marx's concept of labor Habermas

'

claim must be qualified

by making it historically contingent.

On the theoretical

level, Marx's concept of labor has
diverse meanings and

theoretical 'functions.'

On the broadest level labor

refers to the constituting activity of
subjects: labor
creates social and cultural life in all its
forms be they
economic, familial, language and consciousness
or cultural
forms of expression.
On this level it is a broad concept

with numerous diverse meanings and is best understood as
that which constitutes or creates the whole diverse range
of human forms of expression.

That Habermas' claim must be made historically

contingent means simply that the forms of expression of

labor are social ana
historical.

Specifically, when

la^

xs subsuxne. by capital
there is a tendency for
all of its

forms of expression to
become instrumental.

While Marx is not completely
clear on the following
point one may extrapolate
from his speculative
comments on
the system of automated
machinery and its implications
for
labor that labor need not
inevitably be instrumental.
Labor expended for the
production of wealth
in a

socialized mode of automated
production would not be
defined by the technical
requirements of the production
process or by the economic
imperatives of capital.
Labor, rather than being defined
by the production
process, would instead define
production, while there may
always be a realm of necessary labor,
that labor need not
always be the burdensome brute activity
of subjects

strictly determined by profit and
technique (division of
labor).
In other words, even necessary labor
need
not

always be abstract, instrumental labor.

But whether this

admittedly speculative interpretation can be
sustained is
of little consequence.
Marx clearly places human

labor as

instrumental activity in the historical dimension, not
in
the metatheoretical dimension.

I

suggest that one possible explanation of Habermas'

analysis is that he has confused or conflated the

theoretical and historical
xeveis of an.i.
levels
analysis in Marx.
in
Ha.er.as. analysis la.or
always is solely
instrumentalthe realm instrumental
activity has the force
of ontology
behind it.
in Marx, however,
instrumental activity has
the force of history
behind it: the history
of capitalist
social relations.
•

•

Habermas claims that Marx's
understanding of labo r as
instrumental necessarily entails
an instrumental
epistemology is thus also open
to question.

Habermas-

Observation that Marx held
instrumental knowledge to be
materialized in the instruments
of production is a valid
though partial statement of
Marx's theory
of knowledge.

Marx was certainly concerned
with explaining the
relationship between objectifying,
instrumental knowledge
and economic production.
Clearly capital, concerned with
extracting surplus value and, formally
and
"really"

subsumes labor and establishes a
systematic instrumental
and pragmatic relation between natural
science
and

production, i.e., between subject and object
and social

consciousness and social being.

But, as I have argued

above, capital is a social and historical
relation.

The

fundamental point of Marx's analysis of the fetishism
of

commodities is that the objects of labor cease being under
the control of the producer and become an independent
force that dominates the producer.

In the language of

Haberraas. mentor, .ao.no,

-The self-„ade thing
becomes a
thing-in-itself, fro. which
the self cannot escape

anymore......"
forra is a

..ysterious thing, because
exchange value, which
rsally the expression of a
syste. of social relations
aEEears to be a natural property
of the commodity
"Exchange value is not caused^
a system of social
relationships, or traceable to
a system of social
relationships, or exElainable
in terms of a system of
social relationships; exchange
value is a system of social
relationships.

The same problem may be posed
as follows: Habermas
claims what is Kantian about Marx's
epistemology is
"...the invariant relation of the
species to its natural
environment..." whether Kantian or not,
this claim is on
one level trivially true. Human beings
are natural
beings, evolved within natural processes
(i.e., have a
natural history) and exist in a metabolic
relationship

(1973)

,

p. 346.

Wolff (
), How to read Das Kapital.
Adorno makes
the exact same point when he states: "The fetish
chapter's
•theological
quirks
of
merchandise'
mock the
false
consciousness in which the social relation of the exchange
value IS reflected to contracting parties as a quality of
things-in-themselves; but those quirks are also as true as
the practice of bloody idolatry was once a fact.
For the
constitutive forms of socialization, of which mystification
is one, maintain their absolute supremacy over mankind as
if they were divine Providence." (1973), p. 356.

w.t. nature.

Mar. in.ee. trie,
to capture the
ai„ensions
Of this complex Of
relations that Xin.
the subject an.
nature in his ontology
and economics.
However, for
Haber.as, this ontological
complex of relations
is
necessarily characterise.
,in all historical
epochs an.
arising out of the
contingencies of the natural
evolution
Of the species, by a
behavioral system of
instrumental
actron.
Human beings must
interact with nature an.
have
acquired technical,
instrumental knowledge about
nature.
But the critical point
is that these rules
"take on
sensuous existence and belong
to the historically
alterable inventory of societies.""'
it is precisely the
historical dimension that
Habermas' formulation slights
and conversely, that Marx's
captures,
it is a question of
Whether, and how, objectified
technical rules (science)
have come to dominate the labor
process to the exclusion
of other rules and transformed
labor into instrumental
action.
Marx assumes that undistorted,
that is
scientific, knowledge of social
relations is possible and
that the conscious subject can
transcend both the
instrumental social relations and
ideological fetters
imposed on consciousness by an alienated
mode of

production.

Knowledge, then, is not restricte. to
purely

instrumental modes of apprehending the world.

(1971), p. 35.
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rn Chapter I,

i

noted that Haberraas
appears to

identify the ter.s labor,
production and „or.. and
that
this identification
raised so^e interesting
question and
proMe.s. whiie .any
co«entators have discussed
problems
with Haber^as. use of
the categories of
labor and
interaction, few have done
so with the clarity
of
Giddens.'- ;,s he argues,
Haber»as presents the two
categories as referring to
different types of actions.
Labor refers to instrumental
action, or purposefulrational, and interaction
refers to

co^unicative

interaction.

But Giddens contends
that neither is a
•type- of action.
Rather they are analytical,
"or

idealized features of action,
like Weber's categories fro™
which in some part they draw
their inspiration.""'

The problem, as Giddens see
it, and
it correctly,

I

believe he sees

is that it is problematic to
use an

analytical element or category as
equivalent to, as
—
tor
a somewhat more sympathetic
discussion of this
p. 389-92, who raises the objection
that since labor is
always in and through society it is more
adequately seen as
a subcategory of social interaction.
As Held states i?does understand the unfolding of human
powers
and needs in history in relation to labour,
this does not
entail
the
collapse
of
interaction
into
a
narrow
instrumentalist framework. The referent of labour
is always
a form of social activity."
IOC

f

1

83

Thompson and Held (1982),

p. 156.

Giddens states it
It, a

"c=n^^«,^
u
substantive

type"

of action. '« „arx
dxd not employ Xabor
as a type, ideal
or otherwise, while
Weber clearly intended
his categories to be
Just that:
types.
There is, in effect,
eff^^r^-h
^
a
conceptual sloppiness here
that Giddens believes "IpaHo -i-^
leads to quite serious
conceptual
consequences for Habern^as
work as a whole." The
identification by Haber.as
of labor, production,
wor. and
instrumental action do not
serve his project well.
.

m

•

Giddens suggests that this
terminological confusion
could be eliminated by
defining labor as "the
socially
productive activities whereby
human beings interact
creatively with material nature. "^«^
Praxis should be
reserved for a broader meaning
associated with the
philosophical tradition of vico,
for example, as the

constituting activity of social
life.
suggestion, and one

I

think it unnecessary.

This is a useful

am sympathetic towards although

I

if one accepts the bi-level
theory

of the structure of Marx's thought
elaborated in this
work, this particular conceptual
problem would be solved
by clearly keeping in mind on what
level, metatheoretical
or historical, the discussion of labor
is taking place,
i.e., is one discussing labor as socially
constitutive

184

1

85

.

,

T-,
Ibid.

Ibid., p. 157.
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action in general, or
as subsumed by the
capitalist
production process.

Habe^as has responded
labor, or praxis,

in part to the critiois^s
that

^st

be retained by social
theory as a
•Philosophic, concept. He
argues that the problen,
lies in
trying to expand the
economic concept a in

philosophically

meaningful way.

Haber.as argues that
"...we need an
analytic clarification of
the question as to whether
the
economic concept of labour
can really be expanded
into the
concept Of a simultaneously
creative and self- formative
"^^^
productivity.

Marx certainly did not see
himself as expanding a
narrow instrumental concept of
labor into a philosophical
concept capable of supporting the
theoretical edifice of a
dialectic of labor and critical-revolutionary

action.
Rather, he came from a philosophic
tradition, of which he
was very well aware, that put the
philosophic concept at
its center.
For example: Marx viewed Hegel's
advance as
in seeing the movement of history as
the dialectic of

labor, his failure was in seeing only mental
labor.

also saw himself in the tradition of Vico.

He

Avineri

correctly notes that: "Marx does not consider himself
the

"A Reply to my Critics" Thompson and Held,
p

.

225

.

(1982)
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first to have suggested
that ™an creates himself
by his
own wor.. Some of his
re.ar.s attest to his
indebtedness
to Gia»battista vico, and
in one case he refers
to vico in
connection with the development
of technology ...
From
letters to Lassalle and Engels
„e know that Marx had been
reading vico in 1862 while
preparing the final draft of
eaMtal. in this light, it may be
more appropriate to ask
if the -philosophical,
concept of labor can be specified
more precisely so as to account
for specific social and
historical forms of labor. As I
see it, this was Marx's
approach: to analytically clarify
the philosophical, or
metatheoretical, meanings of labor and
develop a

historical and social theory of the
forms of expression of
actual human labor.

Habermas' criticism that Marx fails to
adequately

account for self-reflection is substantially
correct.

A

systematic theory of knowledge is not systematically

elaborated and nowhere does Marx explain or elaborate

a

process through which subjects can come to transcend the
ideological distortions imposed by the material relations
of capitalist production.

In other words, what brings

about the conditions sufficient for subjects to critically

question existing social relations and their

(1968), p. 77.

understandings of the sa^eT
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In this author's
view it

seeras

li.ely that Marx assumed
that the disjuncture or
non-identity between reality
and consciousness
(self-understandings) provided i-v.^ in
the "leverage" for
y
critique
and self-reflection.
;

Whether one examines Marx's
early critique of Hegel's

S^milo^pphie

or his later critique
of bourgeois
political economy, one will
find that it is a two-pronged
attack.
First, criticism is
directed against the existing
state Of affairs (whether
state or economy) and second,
against the most sophisticated
self- understandings and

theoretical presentations (whether
it be Hegel or
Ricardo)
The actual working of a
capitalist economy can
provide the needed leverage against
the theory as well as
the theory providing leverage
against
.

the reality.

To the

extent that theory and reality are
not identical, that
there are non-identities and contradictions,
the

possibilities for critique exist.

Furthermore one may

assume, as Marx apparently did, that
the privations

exacted by capitalist production will impel
the subject to
question a previously unquestioned, natural understanding
of society.

in other words, the cunning of history,

materialistically understood as the unintended
consequences of an uncontrolled system of
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production, will somehow engender
the conditions for
enlightenment. while these arguments
are insightful and
suggestive, they are not sufficient
to account for
critical self-reflection. They
rely too much on hopeful
assumptions.
it is for this reason that
neo-Marxists from
Lukacs to Habermas have wrestled with
the problem of the
subjective basis for revolution.

Habermas' additional claim that Marx's
epistemology
lapses into positivism on account of this
failure to

account for self-reflection is specious and
anachronistic.
As I have argued above, Marx does not
misunderstand
his

theoretical efforts and see his critique of political

economy as a branch of the natural sciences.

First, what

Marx meant by science is something altogether different
from the meanings attributed to him by subsequent

interpreters.

Science meant, as

I

have argued, the

investigation of the social practices (the realm of
becoming) that constitute the fixed forms of objectivity.
Second, Marx's critique of political economy is in large

part a critique of its positivist orientation.

In sum,

one of the fundamental mystifications of political economy
is the perception of historically transient productive and

social relations as being timeless, eternal and

supra-historical.

The "laws" discovered by political

economy were revealed by Marx to be (to use terminology
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Marx did not) scientistic
misunderstandings in as .uch as
the laws Of political
economy are a social product
misconceived as natural. This
is precisely Marx's point
in criticizing a leading
positivist of his day:
"Hence

Auguste Comte and his school
might just as well have shown
that feudal lords are an eternal
necessity, in the same

way as they have done in the
case of the lords of
capital "^^^
.

Let us note here that Habermas

•

s

attribution to Marx

of an intention to uncover the
laws of motion of

capitalist society as natural laws is an
interpretation
emphatically rejected by his mentor, Adorno.
citing the
same quote as Habermas but to prove the
opposite
point,

Adorno argues that:
The youthful Marx expressed the unending
entwinement
of the two elements [nature and history]
with an
extremist vigor bound to irritate dogmatic
materialists.
"We know only a single science, the
science of history. History can be considered from
two sides... Yet there is no separating the two sides;
as long as men exist, natural and human history will
qualify each other. "^^'

Adorno understood the irony in the construct 'natural
history.

'

it is the uncontrolled social product that

brings to history the force of nature.

(1977)

,

p.

451.

Adorno (1973)

,

p.

358.

The 'natural laws'

operative in a historical
epoch acquire the status
of a
dominating force "because
of its [their] inevitable
Character under the prevailing
conditions of
production.""" History appears
natural to subjects
because it is "neither seated
in their consciousness
nor
subsumed under the. as a
whole." There is no mistaking
Adorno's position when he
states:

Habermas seems to take Marx

-a la

lettre.

•

what for

Adorno is an unending entwinement of
nature and history is
for Habermas the reduction of the
latter
to the former.

Perhaps the cure for those who read
Marx's use of the
phrase -laws of nature- is to put quotes
around it so as
to emphasize the ironic nature of the
construction when
applied to society. This may serve as a
reminder that the
'laws'

of social development appear as natural
and act as

if they were natural

(from the perspective of the subject)

but are the creation of a subject who is not the
conscious

author of his own history.

191

Ibid.

,

p.

354.

Ibid.

,

p.

355.
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If Haberxnas had
wanted to conclusively
argue the case
for Marx.s positivism
he could have employed
the criteria

derived from his analysis
of Comte-s positivism.
other
words, he could have
argued that Marx's
categorical
structure could be subsumed
by a definition of
positivism
in this analysis, Habermas
distills the concept

m

.positive-

into five possible meanings:
sense certainty,
methodological certainty, the
deduction of law-like
hypotheses, technical utilization
of knowledge, and the
relativity and unfinished state
of knowledge
J'^

But again, Marx's approach
simply cannot be fit into
the mold.
For example, the methodological
requirement of
the deduction of law-like
hypotheses necessitates that
specific cases be subsumed under
general laws.
if Marx

had been a positivist in this sense,
he would not have
needed the historical level of concepts.
Rather, the

metatheoretical level would have been justified
as a
statement of the laws of nature and historical
specifics
would fall under the general laws.

Finally, it is inappropriate to attribute to Marx
the

crimes of his adherents.

Habermas is wrong in seeing

existing socialist societies as the logical working out of

see (1971), p. 74-77.
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tendencies in Marx's theory.

This is a peculiarly

idealist construction of
history given Habern^as
self-understanding as a materialist.
if Haber.as object
Of analysis is Marxism,
in the sense of a
legitimating
ideology as developed and
understood in specific Socialist
societies, then his assertion
of its positivistic and
instrumental qualities can scarcely
be questioned.
•

•

if it

is Marx,

then

civilization,

I

believe he is wrong.

A technological

society of "social engineers
and
inmates", a danger faced by any
bureaucratized society
Whether socialist or not, is no
more compatible with the
logical workings out of Marx's
theory than is the
continued existence of a society of
capitalists and
workers whose value lies in their
status as brute objects
and instruments in the production
process.
The idea of
human beings as instruments of either
social engineers or
a

capitalists is flatly
in Marx.

incompatible with the moral vision

The Stalinist purges are no more the
working out

of Marx's theory than psychological torture
and

brainwashing are the working out of the theory of defense
mechanisms in Freud's ego-psychology.

The object of Habermas

'

critique is both Marx and

Marxism and his analysis is weakened by
adequately distinguish between them.

a

failure to

Agnes Heller has

raised a similar question and asserts that Habermas'
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"•••Marx is the institutionalised
one:
Marxism,
historical .aterialis....
Marx that Habermas
critiques
IS the Marx of Marxist
ideology,
or as Heller nicely puts
It, "He reinterprets
the Marx who was already
interpreted
by Marxism. ."^93 if rnis
ic,
this IS,
as It v.
believe, the case, then
Habermas. critique is not
properly speaking a critique
of
Marx.
Rather it is a critique of
Marxism with recourse to
Marx.
While the apparent object
of critique
.

i

•

is Marx, the
real object is many times
removed in space, time, culture
and theoretical intention.
The intent of Habermasconstruction of the ideal speech
situation is oddly
betrayed by his failure to
distinguish between Marx and
Marxism.
Rather than freeing scholarly
debate from
ideological distortion, ideology is
smuggled into his
analysis of Marx and epistemological
issues.

In order to conceptually link Marx
and Marxism one

must assume an identity, both theoretical
and practical,
between, for example, Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin.

There is, indeed, a tendency among a broad spectrum
of

political and social theorists to do precisely that.
Individual writers, depending on their particular focus
and specific axes to

grind, may eliminate or add one or

another terms to the equation.

In general, orthodox

Thompson and Held (1982),

p.

22.

Marxists Wish to affi™
the equation in or.er
to point to
a continuous theoretical
heritage which can sustain
legitimations of ^ne
the evic-i-Tr,..
^
existing state
of affairs
+.

in

socialist countrif^c;
untries.

t av.^
Liberals
and conservatives point
to
the same equation as
proof that Marxism leads
to
-,

Stalinism.

Both positions are
fundamentally ideological
and rigorous analysis of
Marx's own texts will not
sustain
the equation.
For example, take the
first pair of terms:
Marx/Engels. While close friends
and collaborators, Marx
and Engels held to significantly
different views on the
following three topics: human
nature, value theory, and
the dialectic.

Terrance Bell, for instance, has
argued that Marx
held to what he calls a radical
humanist view of human
nature while Engels held a naturalistic,
positivistic
View.
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Marx held that the theory of value is

historically specific to the capitalist mode
of
production.

Engels held that it is trans-historical in

its explanatory power.

A powerful and compelling analysis

by John Weeks demonstrates the range of issues
that this

difference bears upon, including the question of the

transition from feudalism to capitalism.

(1979)

,

p.

(1981), p.

2.

3-62

The question of

a dialectic of nature
has a long history
beginning with

Lukacs and Korch's work
in the l920.s and
.ore recently
with Alfred SchxnidtJThe compelling evidence
is that
Marx.s dialectic is
socio-natural subject-object,
while
Engels- dialectic is an
ontological
,

verity.

The NormativP Fnnnd.ations of

rr-ii-^^.i

r.v,_^„

The major implication of Habermascritique is that
Marx's work does not provide an
adequate normative basis
for critique.
Habermas argues that: "From the
beginning
there was a lack of clarity concerning
the normative
foundation of Marxian social theory. "^'^
Marx could carry
out his critique on the basis of an
immanent critique of

political economy, i.e., through and within
the

understandings of his time.

in other words,

in the

mid-nineteenth century, bourgeois theory was far from
having lost all normative content.

Rather justifications

of capitalism (in political economy) and the state

(natural law theories) depended on the explicit claim that

one or the other, or both, were the only forms of social

196

197

see appendix to Schmidt (1981).
(1979), p.

96.
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organization capable of fostering
the realization of the
nor^s Of freedom, equality,
liberty, and individuality.
Since this was the case, there
was a cultural context to
which Marx need only implicitly
appeal.

But that this is no longer the
case follows from the
fact that "bourgeois consciousness
has become
cynical... "^98
this century, social theory "...has
been thoroughly emptied of binding
normative contents "^'^
Bourgeois ideals no longer rest on a widely
held

m

.

intersubjective consensus but rather tend to
be ritually
and cynically used to legitimate political
action and have
been virtually completely excluded from the
social
sciences in the name of positivism.

This produces the

dilemma that one can not any longer employ
the method of immanent critique with any effect if the

theory one wishes to critique appears to restrict itself
to the purely descriptive and empirical.

The resolution of this dilemma lies at the heart of
Habermas' theoretical project.

The question becomes:

given the dissolution of the background consensus that
once was supportive of bourgeois norms, how is it possible

198

199

(1979)

,

p.

96.

(1979)

,

p.

97
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to "reconstruct (the) general
presuppositions of

communication and procedures for justifying
norms and
values? "200 This is the problem the
construct of the ideal
speech situation seeks to address and
to which I shall
turn shortly.

As noted above, one argument Habermas employs
is to
say that the problem of a normative basis for
Marxian

theory is essentially a historical result of the

dissolution of bourgeois norms.
another argument:

But Habermas advances

the problem is inherent in Marx's

theory. If, as Habermas claims, Marx reduces knowledge to

the technical and instrumental, then instrumental reason
is the only normative basis available to Marx and Marxist

criticism.

But,

as I have shown, this claim is true only

in the restricted sense that Marx values objectified

instrumental knowledge in that it allows for, or may be

useful in enabling, a reduction in necessary labor time.

While in capitalist relations this results in greater
surplus value for the capitalist, under socialized

production it has the potential benefit of freeing the
subject from necessary labor.

That capitalism fosters

this development is of considerable benefit to emancipated
labor since the other side of this development is the real

(1979)

,

p.

97
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potential of greater free ti.e
for all-sided human
development. Through the
mediation of social relations,
instrumental knowledge can have

a

normative dimension: a

normative imperative and a
potential for liberation that
may or may not be realized in
historical practice,
specifically, therefor, the distinction
between necessary
and surplus labor is not simply
a technical and economic
term.
it has profound critical and
normative
implications.

As noted earlier the implications of
the argument
that Marx either lacks a normative grounding
of critique
or that grounding is restricted to
capitalist norms of

productivity and calculable efficiency are quite
serious.
For if Marxian theory is morally and ethically
bankrupt it
inevitable leads to treating persons as things and issues
in a social theory of control, manipulation and policy
of

social engineering.

Clearly, also, this problem is not

the exclusive domain of varieties of Marxism.

To be

accurate, it is a function of all social and political

theories positivistically and scientistically oriented
in their methods and perspectives.

To the extent that

historical Marxism has taken on a positivist orientation

-

and this is especially relevant in countries where Marxism
is a legitimating ideology - it is susceptible to this

line of criticism.
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Habermas argues that the
critical theory of Adorno
Horkheimer and Marcuse had
not yet adequately
formulated
the normative and ethical
foundations adequate to sustain
their critique. To phrase
it as a question: to
what
concepts of truth, freedom,
justice can critical theory
appeal in its critique of
capitalism and its justification
of a more just and rational
society that are not
ideological and particularistic
in their scope?
Or to put
it another way, can a critical
theory and its normative
foundations be secure from the very
charge of ideology it
brings against other theories.
As McCarthy states it:
"How does the conception of freedom
on which it relies
insure that critical theory too is
not just another

time-bound (say post-Enlightenment), culture
based (say
secularized bourgeois) and perhaps even
"class"-bound (say
alienated intellectual) standpoint? "^^^ The
perceived
failure of Marx, as well as Horkheimer, Adorno,
and

Marcuse, to settle this question is perhaps the
central

motivation in Habermas

•

work.

His critique of Marx,

analysis of Hegel's -Jena system,' and productive
journey
into linguistics have issued in his theory of

systematically distorted communication, knowledge
constitutive interests and ideal speech situation.

(1975)

,

see McCarthy's introduction to Legitimation Crisis
p. xi-xii
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Habermas stated the core claim
of this theoretical project
in his 1965 Frankfurt
University inaugural lecture:

posited for us^^'oir
firsr:^;t:nc/"'^°"^'^'''^^
unequivocally

the intention
of unive?sa?^nH''^''^^^^S
Of
universal and unconstrained consensus.
Taken
^""^ responsibility constitute the
on?v ?de; ^h^r^""^ possess a priori
the philosophical tradition. Perhapsin the sense of
that is why the
language of German Idealism, according
to which
reason" contains both will and
consciousness as its
elements is not quite obsolete "^^^

r

.

Hence, Habermas

•

theory of communicative competence

is designed to meet the need for a
normative foundation

for social theory.

Drawing on Wittgenstein, Habermas

argues that the concept of language implies the
concept of

reaching an understanding.

This can be stated even more

strongly: reaching an understanding is internal to the

concept of language.

The process of communication through

language would indeed be meaningless if the intention of

reaching an understanding, or consensus, were absent.

But

just as clearly not all communication results in a true

consensus: all sorts of
to prevent it,

i.e.,

^

empirical

•

factors may intervene

relations of force, conscious

deception, and unconscious self-deception.

Yet,

reaching

an understanding or a true consensus, is a concept which

(1973)

,

p.

314.
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all speakers of a "natural language
intuitively know,

therefore it is a priori or innate.

"^^^

A functioning language game presupposes four
claims
that all speakers implicitly understand: "the

comprehensibility of the utterance, the truth of its
prepositional content, the

appropriateness of its

performatory component, and the authenticity of the
speaking subject.

"^^^

In normal social praxis these claims

are "naively" accepted and discourse

proceeds on the

basis of a tacitly held intersubjective
consensus.

background

In such a situation, the above claims are

taken for granted.

If,

however, this intersubjective

background consensus is broken or challenged, the presumed
rationality, truth, morality, and authenticity of a

statement becomes an object of discourse.

If this does

happen, then these questions can be rendered subject to

resolution only if the persons engaged in discourse
suspend all "motives except that of a willingness to come
to an understanding..."

This involves, as McCarthy

elaborates, a willingness to suspend judgement as to the

"existence of certain states of affairs (that may or may

203

204

(1973)

,

p.

17

(1973)

,

p.

18.
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not exist) and as to the Tightness
of certain norms (that
may or may not be correct
.)

The centrality of language lies in its
relating of
three domains: external nature, the social
world and the
subjective world of the speaker. Additionally
it is

through language that a subject comes to demarcate
these
domains.
in other words, through language the subject
differentiates himself from an external nature "that he
objectifies on the third-person attitude of an observer,"
from a social environment "that he conforms to or
deviates
from", and from his own subjective consciousness and

experiences to which the subject has privileged access.

For our purposes what is important in this analysis
are the norms or validity claims that are embedded in

communication and made explicit in the ideal speech
situation.

In ordinary communication,

statements about

external nature carry the implicit claim to be true,

statements pertaining to interaction presuppose a claim to
"Tightness", and the claim to authenticity inheres in

statements regarding the subject's inner nature.

Further,

in discourse there must be a just distribution of chances

205

206

introduction to Habermas (1975),
(1979)

^

p.

xiv.
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to speak and the freedom to
advance propositions and to
challenge and critique claims regarding
the above domains.
As Habermas puts it:

We can examine every utterance to see
whether it is
^^stified or unjustified, truthful or
untruthful, because in speech, grammatical
sentences
are embedded in relations to reality in
such a way
that in an acceptable speech action segments
of
external nature, society, and internal nature always
come into appearance together
These,

in sum,

are norms derived from, or embedded in,

ordinary language, made explicit in the ideal speech
situation construct and with which Habermas hopes to

provide the foundation for critical theory.

My analysis of Marx's concept of labor and the

critique of Habermas presented above suggests that the

question of whether or not Marx holds to norms other than
instrumental rationality is an open question.

I

have

demonstrated that for Marx labor is not solely
instrumental behavior.

If it were then all aspects of

human activity could be judged only by criteria of
technical efficiency and questions of social freedom and
the form of a just society would be susceptible only to

technical answers.

Justice and human freedom would then

be nothing but a technical, bureaucratic problem and the

(1979)

,

p.

67-8.

166

construction of a socialist society
would become the
domain of social engineers.

While a full scale analysis of the
normative aspect
of Marx's work is beyond the scope
of this work, I will
argue,

in conclusion, that strong evidence
exists for the

claim that Marx indeed held to norms that
provide leverage
for his critique of capitalism.
These norms
are:

freedom,

equality, consciousness, sociality and
individuality.

i

shall further demonstrate that Marx was
conscious of the
fact that his method distinguished his work from
the other

political economists (particularly Proudhon)

The Normative Dimension in Marx

In the period of 1843-1844, Marx's work reveals

certain clear intentions: a critique of the state and
money.

Marx viewed the critique of religion as being, in

the main, complete.

political economy is,

His critique of capitalism and
I

shall argue,

informed by and grows
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logically out of his critique
of religion.

As Marx stat es

it:

^

religion ends
man is th^^supreme being for in the doctrine that
man; thus it ends with
i!^^^
?h2
the categorical
imperative to overthrow all
conditions
which man is a debased, enslaved
"^-^avea.
neglected, contemptible being. .^os

m

.

In this context it is clear why
Marx turned from

philosophy to social theory.

The compelling question for

Marx became the analysis of those
conditions other than
religion that oppress humanity e.g. the state
and the

economy.

if the Enlightenment project of demystif
ication

was to be completed, critical analysis of these
forms of
social domination would have to be developed.

Most important from the standpoint of a critique of
Habermas is the normative dimension of Marx's early works,

which is indeed the dominant dimension.

Works such as

"Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Law" are an internal critique of the existing German state

and Hegel's philosophical legitimation of that state.

But

Marx is, at the same time, turning the critical method he
had developed out of his confrontation with Hegel and the

Young Hegelians to a critique of political economy,

specifically James Mill.

Marx had not yet developed an

internal critique of political economy.

(1975)

,

p.

182.

Thus, to critique
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Mill, Marx's weapons are
philosophy, moralistic polemic
and outrage expressed in a
tone very similar to Engel's

contemporaneous work Outli nes of a Critir^ n.

^-MM^VL

lconomy.^°^

The central question for
understanding Marx,
and evaluating Habermas
interpretation, is to determine
whether this philosophical-ethical
dimension of Marx's
critique (and the norms underlying it)
remain a part of
Marx's later works which differ otherwise
in the respect
that they are a fully developed internal
critique of
•

political economy.

Marx's "Comments on James Mill,

'Elemens d' economie

politique'" exemplify his strategy of employing
a

philosophical-ethical critique against political economy.
For example, in discussing Mill on money as a
medium
of

exchange, Marx has nothing to say about money
that we

would normally construe as an economic statement or
critique.

Instead Marx employs the Hegelian terminology

of mediation and alienation to demonstrate that human

social activity becomes "A material thing outside man".^^^
In these passages Marx is concerned to point out that in a

system of exchange things no longer have significance

209

Marx,

Engels

(1981)
(1975)

,

p.

212.

(1975),

p.

418-443.

see

also Rubel
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because of a relationship to a
subject but instead gain
significance as expressions of monetary
value.

Money represents an alien force
which appears as a
"product and yet as the non-product"
of man finally
debasing and dehumanizing man by
commodifying his social,
moral and psychological existence
a system of
credit, the moral quality that makes
a person "good" is

m

.

nothing more than the ability to repay.

As Marx puts it:

Credit is the economic judgment on the morality
of
.Within the credit relationship, it is not the
case that money is transcended in man, but that
man
himself IS turned into money. .Human individuality
human morality itself, has become both an object
of
commerce and the material in which money exists."
man.

.

.

Marx argues that such a result demonstrates "the
extent to

which all progress and all inconsistencies in a false
system are extreme retrogression and the extreme

consequence of vileness

"^^^
.

Marx goes on to look closely at the exchange system.
For exchange to occur, one must produce a surplus beyond

by comparison see Capital (1977), p. 47-167. There
money is analyzed as a medium of exchange, store of value,
means of payment, measure of value and relative prices, and
unit of account, or general equivalent.
(1975)

,

p.

214.

(1975)

,

p.

215.

(1975)

,

p.

215.
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one's immediate need.
"above selfish

But this does not mean one
rises

need."

This production for exchange is

not "social" production for
it does not go beyond every
producer producing for himself.
"Each of us sees in his
product only the objectif ication
of his own selfish need,
and therefore in the product of
the other the

objectification of a different selfish need,
independent
of him and alien to him."^^^ The
purchaser of a product
has a need or desire for the object
which Marx argues,
puts the purchaser in a position of
dependence
on the

product.

Of course, the producer of a surplus for
exchange

calculates production on the basis of the purchaser's
need.

In fact, the production of a surplus is only
an

"appearance," a "semblance."

The reality is that the

producer produces for an exchange which he has
conceptualized prior to production.

Producers do not

stand in any human or social relation to these objects or

other producers, since their "respective products.
the means, the mediator

,

the instrument

power of our mutual needs.

215

216

(1975)

,

p. 225.

(1975)

,

p.

226

"^^"^

,

..

are

the acknowledged
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Produced objects have value, significance and meaning

because they are "instruments" or "means" to the

satisfaction of the desires of both the producers and
purchasers.

From the viewpoint of selfish, egoistic need

everything and everyone becomes instrumental.

"For me,

you are rather the means and instrument of producing this

object that is my aim, just as conversely you stand in the
same relationship to my object.

"^^^

In sum, Marx

characterizes the social relationship of production for
exchange as a relationship of master and slave, and one in

which persons become the instruments or servants of their
desire.

While in Capital the language changes, the point

is still the same:

exchange is unfree and unequal and does

not conform to the discourse which characterizes the

market ideology of classical political economy.

At the conclusion of the 'Comments on James Mill,'

and more completely in the Economic and Philosophic

Manuscripts of 1844

^

Marx elaborates the normative basis

The counter-factual assumption is "that

of his critique.

we had carried out production as human beings.

distinctions are as follows:

a)

"^^®

The

the object would be an

objectif ication of the producers "specific character" and

(1975)

Ibid.

,

p.

227.
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"individuality",

b)

an enjoyable "manifestation of (my)

life" during production,

would be known to the producer

c)

as an objectif ication of his personality and powers,

d)

the producer would be conscious of having satisfied a

human need by his work,

e)

by creating an object that is

an expression of the producer's life and the satisfaction
of a social need the producer would realize his human

"social" or communal nature.

Whereas in political economy labor is a

"

means to

life," Marx presupposes that it can be a "free

manifestation of life

,

hence an enjoyment of life."

In

political economy labor and life are no longer related
terms.

If the intrinsic connection between these terms is

sundered, i.e.,
" hateful

if labor is alienated,

torment

... a

.

then it becomes

the semblance of an activity...

forced activity" necessitated by an "external fortuitous
By contrast Marx grounds his critique

need..."^^'

explicitly upon a "real, conscious and true mode of
existence.

enjoyment.

219

220

.

.which is social activity and social
220

(1975)

,

p.

228

(1975)

,

p.

217
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Marx's positing of a normative basis for his critique
of Mill, a basis outside the conceptual
limits of

classical political economy but counter-factually derived
from it, is the factor that he argued distinguishes his

work from Proudhon's.

Marx argued that Proudhon is,

despite his critical pretensions, constrained by political

economy's presuppositions: private property and equality.
With respect to property, Marx remarks:

Proudhon's wish to abolish not having and the old way
of having is quite identical with his wish to abolish
the practically estranged relation of man to his
object ive essence and the economic expression of
human self-estrangement.
But since his criticism of
political economy is still captive to the premises of
political economy, the reappropriation of the
objective world itself is still conceived in the
economic form of possession
.

Proudhon wishes to abolish the inequality of wealth

through the idea of "equal possession."

But his analysis

remains riddled with contradictions in ways similar to the

political economists.

Smith, Ricardo, and Sismondi all

attacked particular forms of private property.
Occasionally, when conscious of a contradiction in

political economy, these authors would discuss what Marx

referred to as the appearance of humanity in economic
relationships.

It is crucial to note that the economists,

"as a rule... take these relations precisely in their

clearly pronounced difference from the human, in their

^

(1975b)

,

p.

43
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Strictly economic sense."

The political economists remain

committed to an economic, or abstract, instrumental, view
of persons and society while Marx clearly maintains that

there is a distinction between the economic relations

understood in their estranged, inhuman form in capitalist
society and a potential "human form."

Proudhon goes as

far as one can, while still trapped in the assumptions of

political economy, in exposing the disparity between the
"

human semblance " of economic relations and "their inhuman

reality.

"^^^

The above analysis indicates that the ethical/

normative assumptions Marx held and briefly elaborated in
the "Comments..." are central to his own understanding of

what distinguished his work from that of the political
economists of his time.

Manuscripts

,

In the first chapter of the

"Wages of Labor", Marx is concerned to show

how the dynamics of capitalist production operate
consistently to the detriment of the worker.

The

advantages that accrue to the capitalist and landlord due
to separation of capital rent and labor are "fatal for the

workers.

"^^^

As capitalist production expands it reduces

the worker "spiritually and physically to the condition of

222

223

(1975b)
(1975)

,

,

p. 33

p.

235.
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a

machine and from being

activity and a belly...

a

"22^

man [he] becomes an abstract
The workers "abstract

activity" Marx refers to here is what he will later term
"labor power," a conceptual advance Marx viewed as one of
his major contributions to political economy.

No matter what socio-economic conditions prevail

workers suffer, despite the fact that all political
economists point out that without labor there is no
wealth, no capital.

When socio-economic conditions

decline workers suffer "increasing misery," in expanding

conditions

"

— misery

with complications, and in a fully

developed state of society

— static

misery.

"^^5

This,

according to the logic of political economy, is the fate
of labor.

It raises,

for Marx, two questions:

1) What in the evolution of mankind is the meaning of
this reduction of the greater part of mankind to
abstract labor? 2) What are the mistakes committed
by the piecemeal reformers, who either want to raise

wages... or regard equality of wages (as Proudhon
does) as the goal of social revolution.

Our attention throughout this work has focused on the
first question and Marx's answer to it.

(1975)

,

p.

236.???

(1975)

,

p.

239.

(1975)

,

p.

241.

The meaning of
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labor in classical political economy
is clear to Marx:
"Labor occurs only in the form of activity as
a source of

livelihood ."

Labor is simply a means to life, an

instrument to be employed in order to live.

Political

economy fails to consider human activity outside the
realm
of production.

Failing to consider other aspects of the

worker as human being, political economy "leaves such

consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to
the statistical tables, to politics and to the poor-house

overseer." 227

in an ironic sense, political economy's

understanding of labor as a commodity, as a thing, is
adequate to its object of study, the capitalist economy

which produces labor in this form.

The crux of Marx's

critique of political economy at this stage is that it
sees labor, and the existing system reproducing labor, as
an oppressive system that produces people fit only for

restrictive, instrumental activity.

Thus far the analysis of Marx's normative dimension

reveals that in his early works the ethical question of
the reduction of labor to a means to life was the basis of
his critique of capitalism at that time he lacked a

critique of political economy that was internal to that

(1975)

,

p.

241.
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subject.

Similarly,

in his critique of Proudhon, Marx

shows he was conscious of the fact that his
theory had a
dimension transcending the limits of political economy,
and the limits constraining Proudhon 's analysis.

follows

I

In what

seek to demonstrate that this normative

dimension is carried through in Marx's later works and is
grounded in the metatheoretical level of analysis.

Marx has

normative dimension in his later works and

a

it is contained in his vision of labor emancipated from

the domination of capital (or the same formulation in

terms of the early Marx: non-alienated labor)

.

Textual

clues to these norms can be found in all of Marx's major
writings.

The norms which infuse his vision of

emancipated labor

I

contend are "The free development of

individualities," 228 consciousness (in terms of conscious
•

'

•

•

•

control of the social product)

,

freedom (in a substantive

rather than formal sense) and sociality.

In Capital

,

Marx characterizes the world of Robinson

Crusoe, Medieval Europe, and an "association of free

men." 229

...

•

The first two exhibit different types of modes of

domination (supremacy and subordination)

228

229

(1973)

,

p.

706.

(1977)

,

p.

169-72

.

Dependency in
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the feudal mode of production (and of feudal society
generally)

is based on personal subordination.

In

capitalism, personal dependence gives way to formal
freedom.

Now free from political and religious

constraints, labor is formally and "really" subsumed under

capital (the objective factors of production become alien

property and the subject becomes an instrument)

.

Perhaps

nowhere else is Marx so bitterly ironic as in the famous

passage where he lays bare the norms that justify
commodity exchange, the "very Eden of the innate rights of
man."

Marx continues:
It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham.
Freedom, because both buyer
and seller of a commodity, let us say of labor-power,
are determined only by their own free will.
They
contract as free persons, who are equal before the
law.
Their contract is the final result in which
their joint will finds a common legal expression.
Equality, because each enters into relation with the
other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and
they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property,
because each disposes only of what is his own. And
Bentham, because each looks only to his own
advantage.
The only force bringing them together and
putting them into relation with each other, is the
selfishness, the gain and the private interest of
Each pays heed to himself only, and no one
each.
worries about the others. And precisely for that
reason, either in accordance with the pre-established
harmony of things, or under the auspices of an
omniscient providence, they all work together to
their mutual advantage, for the commonweal, and in

the common interest."

(1977)

,

p.

280.
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Marx's vision of emancipated labor is presented as

a

free association of producers commonly owning the means
of

production.

They exercise their labor under conditions

"transparent" to their consciousness."^

Under their

conscious control, the social product no longer assumes
its fantastic forms.

If the normative dimension of Marx's critique is

expressed in his vision of emancipated labor, it is

grounded in the metatheoretical level of analysis.

It is

for that reason that Habermas fails to recognize it.

Marx's analysis of man in capitalism is that he is

alienated

from self through the sale of labor power,

2)

from the product through capitalist property relations,

3)

1)

from nature which becomes brute objectivity that is

treated instrumentally

,

4)

from

others through the

impoverished social relations of utilitarian self
interest, and

5)

from consciousness which must become

separate from the body and sensuousness to maintain the
fiction of freedom and allow the sale of labor power.
However, the metatheoretical level provides a realm

abstracted from these specific historical relations, a
realm in which the subject can be conceptualized in a

manner not constrained by existing social relations.

^

(1977)

,

p.

172

That
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man is an active being can be seen to imply that this
activity can be a pleasure rather than a burden, a

manifestation of life rather than merely a means.

That

man is an objective being implies the counter-factual

possibility that the product can truly be the

manifestation of the subject's powers and under the
control of the subject.

That the subject is a natural

being implies that the subject can relate to both internal
and external nature in ways other than instrumentally

That man is a social being implies relations that can be

characterized as a bond or community rather than
atomistically

.

Marx's anthropology is fundamentally one

which stresses the potential development and realization
of man's powers.

232
notes, a
This is, as McPherson

fundamentally ethical concept of man.

Seen from the vantage point of Marx's ontological
assumptions, being or socially produced objectivity can

take forms other than those characterized by alienation
and the commodity forms.

That man must appropriate nature

In discussing power, McPherson distinguishes between
an ethical and descriptive concept. The ethical concept of
power is defined as the subject's ability "to use and
develop his essentially human capacities ... and his power
must include access to the means of using his capacities,
and that his power is diminished by lack of such access."
He develops the concept of "extractive power" to cover the
(1973), p.
ability of one person to use another's power.
39-76.
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in the form of useful objects, carry on this activity
with

others, does not necessitate that the social relations and

material objectivity thereby produced be a hostile and

uncontrollable power that requires the commodif ication of
these essential relations.

From an epistemological perspective a mentally and

physically active subject constitutes the world of objects
and social relations and the forms through which these are
known.

If we may imagine that this world could be the

conscious product of the social individual then the
illusions created by an objectivity out of the subject's
control would vanish. The fetishism of the commodity,
money, the trinity formula, etc.

they are: a social product.

,

could be seen as what

By abstracting from the

specific forms of historical social relations and by
focusing on the common, universal and necessary conditions
of social existence, Marx creates a conceptual space

suitable to the grounding of normative assumptions.

Habermas asks us to conceive of communicative
relations free of all the distortions inherent in ordinary
life: power, deception and self-deception.

Marx asks us

to conceive of the relations of human activity (labor)
a

way free from historical conditions of domination:

in
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exploitation, property relations,
alienation.
Each,
though starting from different
paradigms and with
different theoretical projects, wants
to abstract from
real conditions that distort those
paradigms and to
construct a vision of an alternative.
For Habermas,
speech acts implicitly carry with them
claims to be true
or untrue, authentic or inauthentic,
normative or ethical.
Tightness and equality of participation and
freedom from
constraints. These claims, while they inhere in
ordinary

communication, are made explicit in the ideal speech

situation construct.

Similarly, Marx claims that human

labor abstracted from historical distortions can be

carried out freely and in control by conscious social
individuals.

Habermas claims the centrality of language

lies in its relating the domains of external nature,

internal nature and the social world.

brings these domains together.

Speech necessarily

So also does labor.

Finally, Habermas' theory is animated by an

overriding interest in human autonomy and the realization
of such through a theory with a practical intent

realizing a just and free society.
interest.

This, too,

— that

of

is Marx's

His analysis of capitalism reveals the extent

to which freedom and autonomy are fictions in capitalist

society.
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These powerful similarities suggest,
in this writer's
opinion, that Habermas has not so much
transcended the

limitations of Marx but rather tends to provide
a powerful
confirmation of the intent of Marx's theoretical
project.
Marx's analyses penetrate the secret language
of

commodities while Habermas penetrates the presuppositions
of language.

These analyses complement each other.

Both theorists try to base hope for human

emancipation on assumptions derived from aspects of human
existence.

They argue that underlying labor and language

is a dimension of general,

abstract, universal and

necessary assumptions: apriori assumptions.

Given the

intent of their respective projects, that their thought is

animated by 'emancipatory interest' and part of a

historical tradition of critical theory, it should not be
surprising to find that the normative assumptions upon

which each theory relies are similar, if not virtually
identical
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